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ABSTRACT 
      Organizations face normative pressures from institutional actors to adopt various 
practices. Much institutional research has offered insights about diffusion processes, decoupling, 
and adoptions’ implication for organizational legitimacy. However, this vast literature appears to 
have largely overlooked a parallel set of questions about whether and when institutionally 
prescribed practices deliver the intended outcomes. The questions are important given the dual 
nature of practices: They have both technical and institutional characteristics and serve as both 
tools and symbols. Such dual nature of practices has also been recognized to be accountable for 
unintended negative consequences of technically sound practices. Chapter 2 of my dissertation 
has two objectives. First, it provides needed empirical evidence about the intended consequences 
of institutional prescriptions in the context of Korean manufacturing firms. Following the 1997 
Asian Financial Crisis, Korean firms faced normative pressure to adopt a comprehensive set of 
new market-oriented HR practices, where the practices were intended to facilitate innovation. 
Based on the positive effect of the prescription found in this context, I build more general theory 
about the conditions under which prescriptions deliver intended outcomes. The second objective 
of Chapter 2 is to develop and test theory about the types of practices more or less likely to 
deliver intended effects. Consistent with the theory’s predictions, the results show that the 
prescribed practices have divergent effects on innovation. Chapter 3, which is a qualitative add-
on to Chapter 2, examines the practices’ organizational ramifications and innovation outcomes 
through a comparative case study of four major conglomerates in Korea. By doing so, the 
chapter aims to provide a deeper understanding of the mechanism behind the divergent effects of 
the prescribed HR practices. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
      Organizations operate in institutional environments which contain normative pressures 
and prescriptions (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Scott, 2008). Such 
pressures, which often emanate from prominent institutional actors, compel organizations to 
adopt various practices (Baron, Dobbin & Jennings, 1986; Dobbin, Sutton, Meyer & Scott, 1993; 
Sutton, Dobbin, Meyer & Scott, 1994). Over the last few decades, a large body of institutional 
research has examined these pressures, the diffusion processes which they set in motion, and the 
factors that facilitate adoption of practices (Davis & Greve, 1997; Edelman, 1990; Greenwood, 
Diaz, Li & Lorente, 2010; Sutton & Dobbin, 1996; Tolbert & Zucker, 1983; Westphal & Zajac, 
1994). These works also have examined various forces leading to organizational resistance, 
decoupling, and adoptions’ implication for organizational legitimacy (Ansari, Fiss & Zajac, 2010; 
Fiss & Zajac, 2004; Huy, Corley & Kraatz, 2014; Oliver, 1991; Westphal, Gulati & Shortell, 
1997; Staw & Epstein, 2000; Zajac & Westphal, 2004). 
      While this vast literature has provided many insights, it appears to have largely 
overlooked a parallel set of questions and dynamics that are no less important. These questions 
concern whether and when institutional prescriptions deliver the intended outcomes (Bromley & 
Powell, 2012; Hinings & Greenwood, 2015). The questions are important given the dual nature 
of practices: They have both technical and institutional characteristics and serve as both tools and 
symbols. Practices serve as norms and symbols for maintaining the existing institutional order of 
organizations and their legitimacy (Abrahamson, 1991; Meyer & Rowan, 1977). At the same 
time, they also serve as technical means to achieve specific ends of improving organizations and 
the broader society (Skocpol, 1985; Stinchcombe, 1997; Thompson, 1967). The dual 
characteristics and purposes of practices, however, are often in tension against each other and 
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thereby produce unintended negative consequences in organizations (Selznick, 1957). For 
instance, adoption of practices that seem to be sound in a technical sense can undermine the 
institutional order of organizations as well as their functioning (Bromley & Powell, 2012; Kraatz, 
Ventresca & Deng, 2010; Scott, 1998; Selznick, 1949). 
      In response to the perceived need for research on the intended consequences of 
institutional prescriptions, this dissertation addresses two broad theoretical questions. First, can 
practices prescribed by institutional actors deliver the intended outcomes and under what 
condition? Second, what specific types of practices are more or less likely to deliver the intended 
effects? In Chapter 2, I examine the intended consequences of institutional prescriptions in one 
appealing context. Based on the observations from this context and comparison to other studies, I 
build theory about the conditions under which prescriptions deliver intended outcomes. This 
chapter then shifts attention to possible variation among prescribed practices and develops and 
tests theory about the types of practices associated with better or worse outcomes. Building on 
existing institutional literature, I propose that prescribed practices will ultimately yield the 
intended effects when they can be reconciled with the existing institutional order of organizations. 
Chapter 3, which is a qualitative add-on to Chapter 2, examines the practices’ effects through a 
comparative case study of large-scale organizations that have particular significance for a 
nation’s economy and society. By doing so, the chapter delves deeper into the mechanisms 
underlying the possibly divergent effects of different types of practices. 
      The empirical context of this study is Korean firms’ adoption of human resource (HR) 
practices and its consequences on innovation following the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis. The 
context is well suited to the purpose of this dissertation because the pressure to adopt practices 
was unambiguously imposed on all firms in the field, and the practices were intended to achieve 
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a particular and measurable end. Following the financial crisis, Korean firms faced the normative 
pressure to adopt a comprehensive set of new market-oriented HR practices. The practices 
included flattened hierarchy, open job bidding, management by objectives, and individual 
performance incentives, which spanned the major functional domains of human resource 
management (HRM). The practices were prescribed by prominent institutional actors such as the 
International Monetary Funds and the Korean government, and were intended to turnaround the 
troubled firms (Chang, 2003). In particular, the practices promised to advance Korean firms’ 
competitive niche by facilitating innovation, where the crisis has made Korean firm’s previous 
competitive advantage in low-cost products obsolete (Amsden, 1989; Cumings, 1997). The set of 
new practices was recognized to be sound in a technical sense where theory and evidence 
suggest they would facilitate innovation (i.e., High-Performance Work Systems) (Fulmer, Gehart 
& Scott, 2003; Noe, Hollenbeck, Gerhardt & Wright, 2015; Pfeffer, 1998). 
      Chapter 2 first examines whether the practices prescribed by institutional actors in Korea 
facilitated the intended innovation. Having examined the prescribed practices altogether have 
positive effect on innovation, I provide theoretical explanations why the practices could have 
effectively worked in the current context. The chapter then applies the developed theory about 
the types of practices more or less likely to deliver the intended effects to the Korean context and 
tests whether the prescribed HR practices varied in facilitating innovation. I test the hypotheses 
using a stratified random sample of Korean manufacturing firms, which consists of 511 firms 
over 12 years from 1998 to 2009. Chapter 3 examines the practices’ organizational ramifications 
and innovation outcomes through a qualitative comparative case study of four major 
conglomerates in Korea. The conglomerates are Samsung, Hyundai, LG, SK, and as of 1997, 
they constituted up to half of the whole Korean economy. By examining the practices’ effects in 
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these organizations, the chapter aims to provide a deeper understanding of the mechanism behind 
the divergent effects of the prescribed HR practices. 
      This dissertation contributes to institutional theory and management literature in three 
main ways. First, it highlights the dual nature of practices and directs attention to the intended 
consequences of institutional prescriptions. By doings so, my dissertation reopens a problem 
domain that merits attention from institutional theorists. In particular, it shows that institutional 
research can productively address practical problems of managing organizational change and 
sustaining their effectiveness. Second, this dissertation provides needed empirical evidence on 
the intended consequences of institutional prescriptions and builds theory about the conditions 
under which institutional prescriptions generally achieve the intended outcomes. While these 
theoretical contributions are distinct, I also tie them together in an integrative framework that 
leverages critical findings from the extant institutional literature. Third, this dissertation 
contributes by developing and testing theory about the types of practices that are more or less 
likely to deliver intended effects. Through the empirical evidence I find and the theory I develop, 
the dissertation informs organizational adopters and institutional prescribers in their efforts to 
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CHAPTER 2: ORGANIZATIONAL CONSEQUENCES OF INSTITUTIONAL 
PRESCRIPTIONS: HR PRACTICES AND INNOVATION IN KOREAN 
MANUFACTURING FIRMS 
      The main objective of Chapter 2 is to provide needed empirical evidence about the 
intended consequences of institutional prescriptions. The chapter also aims to build theory about 
the conditions under which institutional prescriptions achieve the intended outcomes and the type 
of practices that are more or less likely to deliver intended effects. In order to do so, this chapter 
addresses two related theoretical questions in sequence. First, can practices prescribed by 
institutional actors deliver the intended outcomes, and under what conditions? Second, what 
specific types of practices are more or less likely to deliver the intended effects, and why? To 
address the first question, the chapter starts by providing relevant theoretical background. It then 
introduces the context of this dissertation and examines whether institutional prescriptions 
delivered the intended outcomes. Based on the observations from this context and comparison to 
other studies, I build more general theory about the conditions under which prescriptions can 
deliver intended outcomes. The chapter then shifts attention to possible variation among 
practices, which will be the focus in addressing the second question.  
 
Theory: The Organizational Consequences of Institutional Prescriptions 
      The chapter builds on two basic premises. The first premise concerns the dual nature of 
prescribed practices. While the practices partly serve as cultural symbols for maintaining 
legitimacy and securing endorsement by external social constituencies, they are also concrete 
levers that exert influence on internal technical effectiveness and performance of organizations. 
In this regard, practices not only have impact on how external constituencies view or evaluate 
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organizations, but also on the internal operation and technical effectiveness of organizations. The 
second premise concerns the intents of institutional actors and organizations. Institutional actors 
such as the state, regulatory bodies, and professions formulate prescriptions for reasons that are 
partly technical in nature. While these actors are necessarily affected by culture and are carriers 
of ideology of the time, they are at the same time serious problem-solvers who diagnose social 
and economic problems and prescribe policy alternatives on behalf of organizations and the 
broader population (Abrahamson, 1991; Heclo, 1974; Skocpol, 1985; Stinchcombe, 1997). 
Organizations too are inclined to view institutional prescriptions and adopt practices with at least 
one eye toward achieving operational excellence and realizing the intended material benefits. 
While organizations are concerned with legitimacy and gaining societal approval in exchange for 
compliance, they also attempt at solving technical problems, in the absence of other conceivable 
alternatives (Abrahamson & Rosenkopf, 1993; Carberry & King, 2012; Edelman, Uggen & 
Erlanger, 1999; Tolbert & Zucker, 1996). 
      I start addressing the question of whether practices prescribed by institutional actors can 
deliver the intended outcomes by identifying the relevant actors in the larger process and 
considering the steps through which the effects of practices unfolds. The three relevant actors in 
this process are 1) institutional elites who diagnose systematic problems and formulate 
prescriptions, 2) organizational elites who adopt or reject the prescriptions, and 3) organizational 
members who ultimately implement and use the practices in question. Institutional elites, while 
only limitedly so, are at least intendedly rational in prescribing solutions (Baron et al., 1986; 
Dobbin et al., 1993; Edelman, 1992; Sutton et al., 1994). Organizational elites, as boundedly 
rational problem solvers (Simon, 1997), might predict possible negative consequences of the 
prescription and make adoption decisions accordingly (Kraatz, Ventresca & Deng, 2010). 
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Organizational members are the ultimate agents who actually implement the practices in their 
everyday organizational life and realize the practices’ effects. The most critical steps in the 
process involve the interfaces between these actors. Practices prescribed by institutional elites 
cannot achieve any effects unless they are first embraced and adopted by organizational elites 
(Bromley & Powell, 2012). Once adopted, the practices must also be implemented and used by 
those further down in the organizations, including middle managers as well as line employees. 
      Figure 1 provides a simplified representation of this process. It also shows the common 
disconnections and unintended consequences which emerge within this process and thereby 
prevent institutional prescriptions from achieving intended effects. At the first interface, the most 
typical problems include 1) resistance and outright rejection where organizational elites defy or 
ignore prescriptions, and 2) decoupling and symbolism where organizational elites adopt 
practices in a deliberatively deceptive way (Besharov & Smith, 2014; Fiss & Zajac, 2004; Meyer 
& Rowan, 1977; Oliver, 1991; Pache & Santos, 2010; Zajac & Westphal, 2004). Organizational 
elites tend to resist and decouple institutional prescriptions because new practices often prioritize 
alien interests and ideals. For instance, in their study of adoption of shareholder value oriented 
ownership practices among German firms during the 1990s, Fiss and Zajac (2004) suggested that 
firms deceptively adopted the new ownership practice to show compliance to the new norms of 
financial market liberalization, while at the same time protecting incumbent constituents’ (e.g. 
German banks, corporate managers) interests and ideals. In this research, the practices are mainly 
seen as cultural symbols garnering access to external resources than as serving for internal 
operational purposes. 
      At the second interface, typical problems include unintended disruption in organizational 
functioning, where such disruption can overwhelm the intended benefits (Bromley & Powell, 
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2012; Scott, 1998; Selznick, 1949). Adoption of prescribed practices can disrupt organizational 
functioning because the principles underlying new practices often do not fit well with the 
existing institutional order of organizations (Ansari et al., 2010; Detert, Schroeder & Mauriel, 
2000; Hannan & Freeman, 1984; Huy et al., 2014; Greenwood, Raynard, Kodeih, Micelotta & 
Lounsbury, 2011). Institutional order consists of the core structure of organizations and the 
norms and culture that bind its members into an integral whole (Selznick, 1996). It is often 
formed throughout organizations’ histories and can be manifest in a set of organizing principles, 
system of coordination & control, and the way authority is negotiated. Such order is what 
demarcate organizations from mere coalitions, and is therefore understood as the basis of 
competences and everyday functioning of organizations (Selznick, 1957). The misalignment 
between new practices and the existing institutional order frequently involves conflict and 
confusion inside organizations, and could therefore undercut organizational competences (Kraatz 
& Block, 2008; Suchman, 1995). Canato, Ravasi, and Phillips’ (2013) study of implementation 
of Six Sigma at 3M is a point in case. Six Sigma, which emphasize planning, control, and 
accountability, apparently did not fit well with the traditional culture of 3M that encouraged 
entrepreneurial spirit. Despite this, the organizational elites of 3M forced its implementation, 
wherein the organizational members had to experience significant tension. It was possible in this 
case that such tension could have persisted and resulted in organizational breakdown. 
      The process laid out in Figure 1 is necessarily not exhaustive but serves at least three 
critical functions. First, it helps to understand why well-intended and seemingly intelligent 
prescriptions often fail both their beneficiaries and their designers. The path from institutional 
prescriptions to organizational outcomes is a long and winding one, and only when given the 
right condition institutional prescriptions can be expected to actually achieve the intended effects. 
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Second, it helps to understand the conditions which may strengthen this path and enhance shared 
intentionality among the actors involved. Third, it serves as the basis for identifying the types of 
practices that are less likely to face disconnections, trigger less disruption, and therefore deliver 
the benefits as intended by institutional actors. 
 
Context: HR Practices and Innovation in Korean Manufacturing Firms 
 
The 1997 Asian Financial Crisis and Imperative for Innovation 
      I examine the organizational consequences of adopting institutionally prescribed practices 
through an empirical study of Korean manufacturing firms. Following the 1997 Asian Financial 
Crisis, Korean manufacturing firms faced the pressure to adopt a comprehensive set of new 
market-oriented HR practices to facilitate innovation. Before the crisis, Korean firms competed 
successfully in the global economy as efficient producers of low-cost products with refined 
quality by relying on previous-generation technologies transplanted from advanced foreign (e.g., 
Germany, Japan, United States) companies (Amsden, 1989; Cumings, 1997). As I describe below, 
the crisis and the subsequent economic reform initiated and effectuated by the International 
Monetary Funds (IMF) and Korean government set the stage for Korean firms to advance their 
competitive niche through innovation, or to gain independence of source technology from 
advanced foreign companies. 
      The crisis gripped Korea in November 1997, when the Korean government reported the 
drain of nation’s foreign currency reserve. The national currency was devalued by half, and 
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interest rate soared up to 27%. During the turmoil, a relief fund was provided by the IMF. The 
IMF legitimately intervened into the Korean economy through a set of reforms in corporate 
governance, financial institutions, and capital market sector (Chang, 2003). The economic reform 
was firmly implemented by the Korean government and so altered the hitherto stable competitive 
environment in Korea. Korean manufacturing firms were no longer able to enjoy generous 
industry protection provided by the government (e.g., government-guaranteed debt capital with 
favorable interest rate, export oriented economic policy) or capitalize on price advantages based 
on low labor costs (Evans, 1995). This meant an end to their previously established competitive 
advantage in the aforementioned niche. It became imperative for Korean firms to develop more 
innovative “home-grown” technologies to sustain their operation and prevent collapse of the 
manufacturing industry as a whole. 
 
Pressure to Adopt new Market-Oriented HR Practices 
      One notable feature of the economic reform was that it was accompanied by 
corresponding solutions to advance the competitive niche of Korean manufacturing firms. The 
solution attempted at reforming the existing institutional order that uniquely combined the 
principles of bureaucracy and solidarity with prescription of a comprehensive set of new market-
oriented HR practices (Granovetter, 2005; Orrù, Biggart & Hamilton, 1997)
1
. In general, HR 
                                                 
1
 The principles of bureaucracy and solidarity in Korea have historical origins from American Fordist regime 
characterized by extensive division of labor (Edwards, 1978) and from Japanese employment system that 
encouraged social cohesion (Lincoln & Kalleberg, 1990), respectively. For instance, the imprinting effect of the 
state-building project which relied on the United States after the Korean War (1950-1953), and the resource flow 
through the local capitalists’ ties to those in Japan formed during the Japanese imperialist invasion (1910-1945). 
While such order was accused as fetters upon Korean firms’ advancement after the crisis, at the same time, it was 
recognized as the driving force behind their unprecedented growth and contribution to the nation’s economic 
development before the crisis (Block & Evans, 2005). In particular, it served as an effective solution to the collective 
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scholars and practitioners categorize HR practices into functional domains of organization/job 
design, promotion/leadership development, evaluation, and compensation (Noe, Hollenbeck, 
Gerhardt & Wright, 2015). The practices prescribed to Korean firms exhaustively spanned those 
major sub-functions of human resource management (HRM) and aimed to replace old practices 
in each of the above four domains (see Table 1). In organization/job design, flattened hierarchy 
aimed to replace previous organization/job design based on extensive and centralized hierarchy. 
In promotion/leadership development, open job bidding aimed to replace promotion based on 
commitment. In evaluation, management by objectives aimed to replace evaluation based on 
behavior. Finally in compensation, individual performance incentives attempted to replace 
compensation based on seniority. Taken together, the new HR practices promised to solve the 
collective organizational problem of authoritarianism and nepotism by implanting an 
“innovation-friendly” administrative system at Korean firms. All these new practices have in fact 
been recognized to be technically sound, where theory and evidence provide good reason to 
believe each of them would facilitate innovation by inducing market-orientation (Noe et al., 
2015). In particular, these practices have been often considered as the integral part of the “High-
Performance Work Systems” discussed in the human resource management literature (Fulmer et 
al., 2003; Pfeffer, 1998). 
 
Did the HR practices prescribed to Korean firms facilitate the intended innovation? 
      The first theoretical question this dissertation asked was whether and when practices 
prescribed by institutional actors deliver the intended outcomes. Applying this broad theoretical 
                                                                                                                                                             
action problem experienced throughout Korean economy’s developmental histories and contributed to mobilization 
of the mind of Korean people toward the national industrialization project (Granovetter, 2005). 
    12 
question to the context described above leads to the following specific research question: Did the 
prescription formulated by institutional actors in Korea achieve the intended benefits of 
facilitating innovation at Korean firms? Addressing this question also enables inducing more 
general conditions when institutional prescriptions succeed or fail in delivering the intended 
outcomes. For instance, if the prescription turn out to be effective in this context, it becomes 
possible to further examine why. Understanding this reason is important given that institutional 




 and Results 
      The population of this study is targeted to significant manufacturing firms operating 
business in Korea following the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis. A unique panel and event history 
dataset of a stratified random sample of this population is setup by merging three large-scale 
biennial national panel surveys with an archival database of patent grants, financial statements, 
and firm statistics provided by a Korean affiliate of Moody’s (KIS). My sample consists of 511 
firms over twelve years from year 1998 to 2009, and they aggregate into 5944 firm-years 
observations. This timeframe equals to the period when Korean firms substantially innovated. 
      Adoption of each institutionally prescribed HR practice is measured from key respondent 
surveys. Figure 2 and 3 show that the prescribed HR practices were widely adopted among the 
sample Korean firms after the crisis. For the purpose of testing the overall effects of adopting the 
prescribed HR practices, the variable The Number of Practices Adopted is created by adding 
up all four practices. The values are log-transformed (i.e., ln 
X+1
) to obtain log-log specification 
                                                 
2
 A more comprehensive description of the Methods will be provided later in this chapter. 
    13 
and consistent coefficient estimates in the analyses (Chauradia & Somaya, 2018). One year 
lagged data are used in the analyses so that adoption in year 1997 (2008) matches patents granted 
in year 1998 (2009). The construct of innovation are measured as firms’ patent grant counts. 
Figure 4 and 5 show that the firms achieved innovation after the crisis throughout the reform 
period. Return on Assets, Debt-to-Equity Ratio, and R&D Expense are added as control 
variables. R&D expense in raw US dollar values is log-transformed (Chauradia & Somaya, 
2018). One year lagged data are used for the three financial variables. I use fixed effects (i.e., 
firm dummies) negative binominal models for the regression analyses. 
      Table 4 presents the results regarding the effects of adopting the institutionally prescribed 
HR practices on innovation over time. Model 2 in Table 4 shows that the coefficient for Log of 
The Number of Practices Adopted is significant and positive (p < 0.05, β = 0.177). On average, 
doubling the number of practices adopted (i.e., adopting two practices compared to adopting one 
practice; adopting all four practices compared to adopting two practices) amounts to a 13.1% 
(=2
0.177
-1) increase in patent counts for a given year. This suggests that the prescription of HR 
practices formulated by prominent institutional actors in Korea generally achieved the intended 
innovation, following the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis. 
      The current context exemplifies a success case when moving on to the broader national 
level. It appears the Korean manufacturing industry, as a whole, was able to advance its 
competitive niche. For instance, the Competitive Industrial Performance (CIP) Index
3
 provided 
by the United Nations Industrial Development Organization shows that Korean manufacturing 
industry increased its world ranking from 15
th
 in 1998 to 4
th
 in 2009, only to be below Japan, 
                                                 
3
 The CIP index “benchmarks national industrial performance of 118 countries using indicators of an economy’s 
ability to produce and export manufactured goods competitively”. 
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Germany, and the US. Such overall success is not so apparent in other Asian countries that were 
affected by the 1997 Financial Crisis (e.g., Indonesia, Malaysia, Taiwan, and Thailand). For 
instance, Taiwan was above Korea ranked 13
th
 in 1998 and remained 13
th
 in 2009. Malaysia was 
ranked 21
st
 in 1998 and declined to 24
th
 in 2009. Thailand and Indonesia also experienced a 
decline in ranking during this period. 
 
Conditions that Facilitated Institutional Prescriptions to deliver Intended Effects in Korea 
      I delve deeper into understanding why prescribed practices possibly delivered the 
intended effects in Korea. Comparing this context to what other institutional research has studied 
(Canato et al., 2013; Carberry & King, 2012; Fiss & Zajac, 2004; Huy et al., 2014; Oliver, 1991; 
Scott, 1998) allows inducing a set of general conditions under which institutional prescriptions 
deliver intended outcomes
4
. As I further elaborate below, those conditions are 1) high legitimacy 
of institutional and organizational elites, 2) consistent objectives among the actors involved, and 
3) unsustainable status-quos or a sense of urgency. 
      First, a closer examination of the context reveals that prominent institutional actors such 
as the IMF and Korean government held well-established legitimacy in Korea. IMF’s 
intervention in the Korean economy was seen legitimate with the critical relief fund it provided 
to help overcome the unprecedented crisis. The Korean government at that time too enjoyed a 
high degree of legitimacy. As short as a month after the crisis unfolded, the left political party 
                                                 
4
 While the inherent capability of Korean firms could have played an important role in achieving innovation, this 
section focus on general institutional conditions that enables realization of prescribed practices’ intended effects. 
Possible variation among Korean firms is partially addressed in the next section of this chapter by examining the 
varying effects of practices. Chapter 4 of this dissertation more directly deals with this issue by examining the 
antecedents of adoption or variation among organizations in their adoption of prescribed practices. 
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overthrew the right wing in the presidential election for the first time in contemporary Korean 
history (1962-1997). The new regime was elected for its very promise to turnaround the troubled 
nation and was poised to drive strong changes from the outset. In addition to these institutional 
actors, the leaders of Korean firms were generally considered legitimate too. While there was 
controversy as to whether the leaders of Korean firms were accountable for the crisis, they were 
at least considered to have contributed to the success of Korea’s industrialization project. It was 
through such efforts of some organizational elites the grass-root Korean people were genuinely 
emancipated from famine after the Korean War. The legitimacy of institutional and 
organizational elites in the current context can be usefully compared to that of the change agents 
in other contexts. In Russia and Argentina for example, the government in general had a lower 
degree of legitimacy when they enacted major changes in their economy. Furthermore, their 
prescriptions purported to build market principle in place of the state-driven economic model 
faced resistance, damaged functioning organizational institutions, and eventually undermined 
economic development (Block & Evans, 2005). With regard to the legitimacy of organizational 
elites, Huy et al.’s (2014) study of radical organizational change at “Tekco” provides a good 
comparison. In their study, the new top managers hired from outside to execute major changes 
lacked the historicity and corresponding legitimacy that Korean organizational elites enjoyed. 
The top managers’ change efforts had to face strong resistance from middle managers and 
ultimately failed during the implementation stage. In sum, a high degree of legitimacy of 
institutional and organizational elites specifically found in the Korean context can be considered 
as one condition for prescribed practices to have the intended effects.  
      Second, one noticeable aspect of this context is that there were consistency of objectives 
among the actors involved around adoption of the new practices. Given that the practices’ 
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positive effects on innovation were supported by theory and evidence, it can be inferred that 
institutional actors in Korea at least had the intent of facilitating innovation in Korea, among 
others. The nation’s government officials and the mass media further shaped public opinion that 
the established order of Korean firms that combined the principles of bureaucracy and solidarity 
had stifled individual creativity and that a fundamental change is needed. The leaders of Korean 
firms were strongly motivated to experiment with the new practices, as there were no other 
conceivable alternatives to overcome the adverse impacts of the crisis. The grass-root Korean 
people and employees too welcomed the changes their institutional and organizational leaders 
were about to effectuate. Given the weak welfare system in Korea and lack of natural resources, 
the recovery of competitiveness of Korean firms in the global economy was seen as the only 
means of continued living for the ordinary Korean people. Going further, the market-oriented 
changes the new practices would introduce was even recognized by the broader civil society as a 
“natural progress of history” from authoritarianism and nepotism toward democracy in 
workplace governance and employee-labor relations (Song, 2009; Yoon & Chae, 2011). Such 
consistency of objectives from institutional elites all the way through the grass-root employees is 
quite remarkable when comparing to the contexts of other studies. For instance, in Canato et al.’s 
(2013) study, the new CEO of 3M brought with him Six Sigma from General Electric, where he 
was previously a vice president. The objectives of middle and line managers were apparently 
different from that of the CEO as they wanted to keep 3M as an entrepreneurial company. A 
forced implementation of Six Sigma at 3M therefore resulted in internal tension and a phase of 
cultural breakdown. In Scott’s (1998) study of policy failures, he shows how disparate objectives 
between the state and local actors can result into failure of seemingly innocent schemes intended 
to improve human conditions. For instance, state actors have a natural tendency to concentrate 
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their efforts on aesthetic presentation of their utopian plans (i.e., soviet collectivization) to the 
approvers, while necessarily ignoring the essential knowledge built-in the functioning local order. 
Comparing these cases to the current context leads to a conjecture that consistency of objectives 
can be a condition for prescribed practices to have the intended effects. 
      Finally, examining the current context indicates that the unsustainable status-quo and a 
sense of urgency triggered by the financial crisis in Korea could have played a role. The presence 
of such exigency in Korea is comparable to the context of German firms’ adoption of shareholder 
value orientation as studied by Fiss and Zajac (2004). In their study, shareholder value 
orientation diffused through gradual internationalization of capital market and the governments’ 
enactment of Financial Market Promotion Laws. A lack of crisis and substantive need for change 
in the product market side could have been a factor that contributed to the prevalence of 
decoupling in adoption in this context. In contrast to this setting, Carberry and King’s (2013) 
study of US firms’ adoption of stock option expensing involved a major crisis: The Enron 
scandal. Their results show that almost all firms in their sample actually implemented the 
practice, where adoption had substantive impact on performance. Korean firms in this 
dissertation too adopted and implemented the new practices in face of a major financial crisis, 
where the firms made earnest attempts to reorient themselves in the radically changing 
environment. Such comparison along different contexts indicates that unsustainable status-quos 
created by crisis can be a condition that facilitates practices to deliver their effects. 
      While the conditions elaborated here do not guarantee realization of the intended 
outcomes, they could reduce the possibility of disconnections and unintended consequences and 
help closing the gap from institutional elites through grass-root organizational members. The 
theorization provided in this dissertation can be evaluated in other research that examines the 
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intended consequences of institutional prescriptions and the absence or presence of the 
aforementioned conditions. 
 
Theory: Variation among Practices 
      The first question of this chapter addressed so far focused on whether and when 
prescribed practices as a whole deliver their intended effects. The second question of this chapter 
considers possible variation among practices and specifically concerns the types of practices 
more or less likely to deliver the intended effects. To address the second question, the chapter 
proceeds by developing theory that suggests prescribed practices will (not) yield the intended 
effects when they could (not) be reconciled with the existing institutional order of organizations. 
I apply this proposition to the Korean context and derive a categorical distinction among the four 
HR practices prescribed to Korean firms. I test whether the practices prescribed to Korean firms 
systematically varied in facilitating innovation in the proposed manner. 
      Figure 1 introduced before showed the common disconnections and unintended 
consequences that prevent institutional prescriptions from achieving intended effects. Not all 
practices are equally likely to pass through this process without problems, and some practices are 
disproportionately susceptible to disconnections and unintended consequences. While purely 
technical characteristics of practices can play a role in this process, this dissertation focuses on 
the institutional characteristics of practices and especially their ramification on the lived 
experience of the inhabitants of organizations. My general argument is that the practices are less 
likely to face problems throughout the above process and ultimately yield their intended benefits 
when they can be reconciled with the existing institutional order of organizations. When 
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practices can be reconciled with the existing institutional order, the core structure of 
organizations and the culture that bind its members remains intact. At the same time, the 
practices can be kept true to their intents, accepted, internalized, actually used by the members, 
and therefore deliver the intended effects. In contrast, when practices cannot be reconciled with 
the existing institutional order, the tensions can disrupt organizational functioning and produce 
unintended negative effects. While reconciliation is not easy as prescribed practices often invoke 
cultural and political misfit (Ansari et al., 2010), related studies have shown that enrichment of 
organizations’ cultural repertoires can happen through the adoption and implementation 
processes (Canato et al., 2013; Scott & Cole, 2000; Sahlin & Wedlin, 2008). 
      I propose that prescribed practices are more difficult to reconcile when they involve 
changes in the core structure and shared norms of organizations (Ansell, Boin & Farjoun, 2015; 
Haveman, 2009; Knudsen, 1995). This type of practices produces visible changes and can trigger 
complex dynamics among the organizational members that break down the culture that binds 
them together. The changes these practices bring in tend to be revolutionary and divergent in 
nature (Greenwood & Hinings, 1996; Hannan & Freeman, 1984) and have overarching 
ramifications on how people define their mundane organizational life (Baron, Hannan & Burton, 
2001). Such change can further damage functioning organizational institutions by giving rise to 
competing factions and political struggles between the incumbents and the reformers (King, 
Felin & Whetten, 2010). Baron et al.’s (2001) study, for example, showed how radical changes in 
core employment models of US technology companies resulted in departure of key members, 
which in turn adversely impacted performance. 
      In contrast, the practices are less difficult to reconcile when the change mainly affects 
organizational members individually, for instance, their motivation and incentives (Evans & Doz, 
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1992). While all new practices generally produce a certain liability for organizational members, 
this type of practices produces less visible changes and can be implemented with less disruption. 
In general, the change introduced by such practices tend to be more evolutionary and convergent 
in nature (Selznick, 1969) and has less impact on how the members interpret and construct 
collective meaning out of their organizational life (Baron & Kreps, 1999). In the context of US 
saving and loans industry, Haveman (1992) provided evidence organizational change that retains 
the core routines of organizations incurs survival advantage and performance benefits. 
 
What Types of HR Practices are more or less likely to deliver the Intended Innovation? 
      Applying the broad theoretical question about the types of practices more or less likely to 
deliver the intended effects to the current context leads to the following specific research 
question: Did the HR practices prescribed by institutional actors in Korea vary in delivering the 
intended innovation? 
      The theory developed above suggested that prescribed practices are more likely to deliver 
their intended effects when they can be reconciled with the existing institutional order of 
organizations. To see this variation, it is helpful to consider the practices in light of established 
sub-functions of human resource management (HRM). A typical categorization of HR practices 
breaks them down into four major functional domains: organization/job design, 
promotion/leadership development, evaluation, and compensation (Noe et al., 2015). The HR 
practices prescribed to Korean firms are flattened hierarchy, open job bidding, management by 
objectives, and individual performance incentives, where each of these practices usefully maps 
into the four major sub-functions (see Table 1). 
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      This categorization is important because the extent to which the practices can be 
reconciled is concretely manifest in the practices’ correspondence to different sub-functions of 
HRM. Importantly, I suggest that there is a qualitative difference between the sub-functions of 
organization/job design and promotion/leadership development, and the sub-functions of 
evaluation and compensation. For further discussions, I label the former two sub-functions of 
organization/job design and promotion/leadership development as the “upstream HRM”, and the 
latter two sub-functions of evaluation and compensation as the “downstream HRM”. The label of 
upstream and downstream follows from the logical order HR is often taught in contemporary HR 
textbooks and the way it is planned in practice.  
      The effects of the practices pertaining to the upstream HRM are visible to internal 
members in the form of formal organizational charts and job structure. In contrast, the effects of 
the practices pertaining to the downstream HRM are considerably more implicit in view of 
internal members of organizations. How an employee is evaluated and compensated is, at least in 
principle, not formally available or outwardly visible within organizations (Baron and Kreps, 
1999; Burton and DeLong, 2000). Such difference is closely associated with the possibility of 
reconciliation of HR practices. The practices that fall in the domains of upstream HRM (i.e., 
flattened hierarchy, open job bidding) can involve more visible and fundamental changes in the 
organizational structure and shared norms, making these practices harder to reconcile with the 
existing institutional order of organizations. This type of practices is harder to reconcile because 
the visible changes it introduces can precipitate more complex social dynamics among the 
members. Adoption of these practices also require fundamental shift in the way employees make 
collective sense out of their organizational reality, which makes the practices hard to be accepted 
and internalized. In contrast, the practices that fall in the domains of downstream HRM (i.e., 
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management by objectives, individual performance incentives) involve less visible changes in 
individual members’ motivation and incentives, making these practices more feasible to 
reconcile with the existing institutional order. This type of practices can be better accepted and 
implemented because the subtle and more implicit change they introduce have considerably less 
impact on the everyday interactions and the lived experience of organizational members. 
 
Upstream HR Practices 
      Among the four HR practices prescribed to Korean firms, flattened hierarchy and open 
job bidding fall in to the domain of the upstream HRM. Specifically, flattened hierarchy replaces 
extensive and centralized hierarchy within the domain of organization/job design. If 
implemented, such change would disrupt the existing authority base of the managers and may 
even reverse everyday reporting relationships. Open job bidding is an arrangement that replaces 
promotion/leadership development based on commitment. It values professional expertise over 
commitments shown through internal career and prefers external accreditation in considering 
placement to key strategic positions. A strict implementation of this practice would mean 
deterioration of predictable career paths of existing employees. The two practices make the 
tension between bureaucracy and solidarity versus market principles even more pronounced, 
creating strong faultline between the incumbents and the reformers. Because flattened hierarchy 
and open job bidding are hard to reconcile, I predict that these practices are less likely to deliver 
their intended effects of facilitating innovation at Korean firms. 
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Downstream HR practices 
      Among the HR practices prescribed to Korean firms, management by objectives, 
individual performance incentives fall in to the domain of the downstream HRM. Specifically, 
management by objectives replaces evaluation based on behavior. Such change can implicitly 
promote meritocracy and individualism by shaping individual employee’s motivation with result-
based (vs. behavior-based) performance measurement scheme, while leaving the core structure 
intact. Individual performance incentives is an arrangement that replaces seniority based 
compensation in Korea. It can subtly build market rationality into each organizational member 
by linking pay to individual employee’s performance and by incorporating variance in pay. 
While these practices strongly shift individuals’ motivation and incentives in doing work, their 
collective organizational life can still be governed by bureaucracy and solidarity principles 
(Lawrence & Dyer, 1983). Because management by objectives and individual performance 
incentives can be more feasibly reconciled, I predict that these practices are more likely to 
deliver their intended effects of facilitating innovation. Based on the above reasoning, I derive 
the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1: Adoption of management by objectives and individual performance 
incentives (i.e., downstream HR practices) will have a more positive effect than 
adoption of flattened hierarchy and open job bidding (i.e., upstream HR Practices) on 
Korean manufacturing firms’ innovation following the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis. 
       
      While I predict that the practices prescribed to Korean firms may vary in their effects, it 
might be that the type less likely to deliver intended effects can actually have negative influences 
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on innovation. As my theory suggested, prescribed practices can disrupt internal functioning and 
produce unintended negative consequences that overwhelm the intended benefits (Scott, 1998; 
Selznick, 1949). The extent of negative influence is, in part, an empirical matter. In Korea, the 
case of LG Electronics’ decline after the crisis, as compared to Samsung Electronics’ emergence 
as a prosperous global player, provides an anecdote consistent with this stronger form argument. 
LG Electronics proactively attempted to implement flattened hierarchy and open job bidding to 
solve the problems it faced after the crisis. Despite this, LG was unable to substantively innovate 
and faced a decline, for instance, in the emerging smartphone business during this period. 
Although LG’s entry into the electronics industry preceded Samsung by a decade LG and had 
been considered a rival of Samsung Electronics before the crisis, the above practices were hard 
to reconcile and appears to have played a role in LG’s decline (Fortune, 2011). In contrast to LG, 
Samsung Electronics maintained its hierarchy and promotion based on commitment. However, it 
adopted and implemented a striking individual performance incentives program allowing junior 
managers to be compensated more than their seniors. This way, employees in Samsung were able 
to reconcile and internalize the new market rationality and ultimately live in a “dynamic 
bureaucracy” that motivated and incentivized them to respond swiftly to market demands 
(Economist, 2015). I assess the strong form argument through testing the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2a: Adoption of flattened hierarchy and open job bidding will have a 
negative effect on Korean manufacturing firms’ innovation following the 1997 Asian 
Financial Crisis. 
Hypothesis 2b: Adoption of management by objectives and individual performance 
incentives will have a positive effect on Korean manufacturing firms’ innovation 
following the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis. 
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Methods 
 
Sample and Data 
      The population of this study is targeted to significant manufacturing firms operating 
business in Korea following the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis. A unique panel and event history 
dataset of a stratified random sample of this population is setup by merging three large-scale 
biennial national panel surveys with an archival database of patent grants, financial statements, 
and firm statistics provided by a Korean affiliate of Moody’s (KIS). The national survey was 
administered by Korea Research Institute for Vocational Education & Training under the 
supervision of the Korean Ministry of Employment & Labor. As a matter of fact, the survey itself 
was instigated as part of governmental provision to stimulate research supporting post-crisis 
innovation of Korean firms. In order to increase the sample’s representativeness of the whole 
Korean economy and ensure the quality of data, the sampling frame excluded firms with less 
than 100 employees and firms with less than 300 employees if they were not under external 
auditing. The surveys were conducted three times, each in the year of 2005, 2007, and 2009, and 
asked about the year in which several practices were adopted. The survey maintained 
exceptionally high initial response rate (79.6%) and consequent sample retention rate (90.3%, 
76.8%). Attrited firms were replaced by firms with similar size within the same industry. The 
survey was completed by several key respondents (e.g., executive managers) of each firm 
through face-to-face interviews. This ensured all questionnaires to be accurately answered 
according to each manager’s expertise. My sample consists of 511 firms over twelve years from 
year 1998 to 2009, and they aggregate into a highly balanced sample (96.9%) of 5944 firm-year 
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observations
5
. As indicated in the temporal pattern of the dependent variable (see Figure 4 & 5), 
this timeframe equals to the period when Korean firms substantially innovated. 
 
Measures of Variables 
      Innovation. The construct of innovation is measured as firms’ patent grant counts. As 
discussed earlier, a primary problem confronting Korean firms after the crisis was gaining 
independence of source technology from advanced foreign companies or developing more 
innovative home-grown technologies to advance their competitive niche. As shown in Figure 4, 
the number of the sample firms that were granted at least one patent in each year discontinuously 
jumps in year 1999 shortly after the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis, gradually increases throughout 
the period of economic reform, and drops in year 2010 after the 2008 global financial crisis. The 
discontinuous jump reflects the change in the competitive and institutional environment triggered 
by the crisis and reform, the persistent increase of this pattern reflects substantivism in the 
measure, and the drop reflects punctuation in the reform regime. Figure 5 shows the cumulative 
number of sample firms that were granted at least 1 Patent, and it indicates a similar pattern. 
Finally, the mean value of patent grant counts in my sample is 15.54 with values ranging from 0 
to 9170, and the standard deviation is 208.84 (see Table 2). 
      Adoption of Human Resource (HR) Practices. Adoption of each institutionally 
                                                 
5
 Loss in observations came from later establishment and earlier exit of a few firms. Because the sampling was 
based on the sampling frame as of 2002 provided by KIS, sample-selection bias due to possible correlation between 
the latent cause that makes firms survive until 2001 and the characteristic that makes the firms innovate after 2001 
had to be taken into account (Heckman, 1979). In response, a sample-selection indicator variable composed of 32 
firms that underwent re-establishment during the period of 1998-2001 was included in the analyses to test for this 
group effect (Haveman, 1992). Rather than undergoing liquidation or insolvency, ownership change was the 
dominant mode of “working out” financially distressed firms after the 1997 crisis (Economist, 2007). 
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prescribed HR practice is measured from key respondent surveys. The questionnaires asked 
whether their company adopted each of the practices and the year of adoption, if answered “yes”. 
The panel nature of the survey allowed comparison across the three separate responses and 
enabled updating for later adopters. Inter-coder reliability is high (α=0.92), suggesting reliability 
in the respondents’ retrospection. In case of discrepancy, I took the later response
6
. Figure 2 
shows the instantaneous hazard rate of adoption based on non-parametric event history analyses. 
Figure 3 shows the Nelson-Aalen cumulative hazard estimate of adoption. The event histories 
begin in 1960 or in the year of establishment for firms established after 1960 and end in 2008 or 
in the year of exit for firms exited before 2008. The width of analysis time is set to 1 in STATA to 
minimize smoothing in the plots and reveal the maximum detail in the data. The discontinuous 
jumps in the hazard rates in the late 1990s strongly indicate that adoption of the prescribed HR 
practices became prevalent among the sample firms increasingly after the crisis throughout the 
reform period. The panel dataset is setup from the above event histories by treating following 
years of initial adoption as “adopted”. This assumes the effect of adoption is not reversible and 
thus is an absorbing state (Blossfeld, Golsch & Rohwer, 2007), which is in fact one of the 
common assumptions of institutional theory (Scott, 2008). To test Hypothesis 2, the variables of 
Upstream HR Practices and Downstream HR Practices are created by merging management 
by objectives and individual performance incentives, and by merging flattened hierarchy and 
open job bidding, respectively. One year lagged data are used in the analyses so that adoption in 
year 1997 (2008) matches patents granted in year 1998 (2009). This is consistent with normal 
patent approval time in Korea, and the analyses were robust to two years and three years lag. 
                                                 
6
 Questions about abandonment of practices can be raised. In fact, two firms in my sample responded in the 2005 or 
2007 survey that they adopted a practice, but in the 2009 survey responded that they did not adopt. These two 
samples were too small to conduct separate analyses of abandonment of practices. Nevertheless, dropping these 
firms altogether in the sample has no effects on the main regression results. 
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Table 3 shows that the mean of and correlations among the sample firms’ adoption of the 
prescribed HR practices are moderately low, reflecting variation in firms’ choice in adopting the 
practices. Wholesale adoption or other pattern of coupling among practices in adoption would 
have resulted in higher means and correlations. Accordingly, I conduct practice-level analyses 
(i.e., regression) instead of organizational-level analyses (i.e., cluster analysis, fuzzy 
set/qualitative comparative analysis) (Venkatraman, 1989). Finally, in order to validate that 
adoption of the HR practices was primarily an administrative arrangement rather than mere 
justifying rationale aimed at achieving other managerial purposes, I test the correlations between 
adoption of each practice and cumulative layoff activity as of 2008 and find negligible 
correlations across all practices. 
      Control Variables. The following control variables are considered in my analyses. Year 
Dummies are added to take account of contemporaneous correlation (Certo & Semadeni, 2006). 
Year 1997 is set as the baseline control group. Previous studies have suggested that Firm Size 
and Firm Age could be important sources of organizational inertia (Hannan & Freeman, 1984). 
Firm age is measured as number of years elapsed from establishment. Firm size is measured as 
variables categorizing firms by total number of full-time employees. In my sample, 197 firms 
(38.5%) have 100 or more and less than 300 employees, 215 firms (42.1%) have 300 or more 
and less than 1000 employees, 47 firms (9.2%) have 1000 or more and less than 2000 employees, 
and 52 firms (10.2%) have 2000 or more employees. Firms in the smallest firm size category are 
set as the baseline control group. Firms within different industrial context are known to face 
varying institutional forces that differentially shape their propensity to adopt practices (Zajac, 
Kraatz & Bresser, 2000) and varying technical condition that influence firm innovation 
(Christensen & Montgomery, 1981; Rumelt, 1982). The sample firms operated in the following 
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Industries: Food, textile/apparel/leather, chemicals/petroleum, wood/pulp/rubber/ plastic, 
metal/ceramic, machinery/instruments, computer, electric, electronic, automotive/ transportation, 
construction engineering, information technology/software. Firms in the educational/cultural 
services and finance/insurance industry that produced none or negligible amount of patents are 
included as the baseline control group. Publicly Traded firms could be expected to be more 
responsive to changes in the institutional environment (Lounsbury, 2007). Accordingly, firms 
listed in Korea Stock Exchange (KSE; comparable to NYSE), and firms listed in Korean 
Securities Dealers Automated Quotations (KOSDAQ; comparable to NASDAQ) are added as 
control variables
7
. I also control for Return on Assets, Debt-to-Equity Ratio, and R&D 
Expense as they are known as important financial determinants of innovation or patenting 
outcomes
8
 (Levin, Klevorick, Nelson & Winter, 1987; Hall & Ziedonis, 2001). R&D expense in 
raw US dollar values is log-transformed (Chauradia & Somaya, 2018). As in the case of adoption 
of HR practices, one year lagged data are used for the three financial variables. Finally, as noted 
earlier, Sample-Selection Indicator variable is included. 
 
Regression Analyses 
      Given the dependent variable is a count variable with over-dispersion (i.e., dispersion 
                                                 
7
 Firm Size, Industries, Publicly Traded were coded as time-constant variables using firm statistics provided by KIS 
as of 2002. In general, these firm statistics have been archived systematically in Korea only after the reform in 
corporate governance had been solidly implemented by the government. Total sales and asset data were available 
from 1997, and no important within-firm changes in these criteria were found throughout the observations. 
8
 There were missing financial data (240 observations for Return on Assets, 418 for Debt-to-Equity Ratio, 234 for 
R&D Expense), especially during earlier years. I filled these values by extending from later data for beginning 
observations and by linear interpolation of adjacent data for intermediary observations. I also did separate analyses 
that excluded all observations with missing financial data and found no significant differences in coefficients for my 
main hypotheses. 
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parameter alpha is significantly greater than zero in my models), I use Negative Binomial 
regression models to test the hypotheses (Long, 1997). Because Negative Binomial models 
estimate larger standard errors than Poisson models, they are generally known to produce more 
conservative significance tests. Since my main theoretical argument is concerned with examining 
the effect of adopting practices over time regardless of differences in unique organizational 
characteristics, I use fixed effects models (i.e., firm dummies) as the baseline for the regression 
analyses (Angrist & Pischke, 2009). Fixed effects models have the advantage of controlling for 
all time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity and were therefore set as the default regression 
model. The flip side of this advantage, however, is that only within-firm variance is considered in 
estimating the regression coefficients. In effect, fixed effects models discard samples that have 
no longitudinal variance (i.e., firms that were not granted any patent during the study period). 
Other useful information remaining between firms is captured only in the intercepts. This 
information could be particularly useful for examining the effect of adopting practices on some 
firms’ capability to innovate, in relation to other comparable firms. Since random effects models 
produce more efficient coefficient estimates by taking account of this between-firm variance, I 
conduct these additional analyses. Consistency of random effects estimators, however, relies on 
the assumption that there is no correlation between unobserved firm specific effects and other 
independent variables, and this is evaluated based on the results of Hausman test (Halaby, 2004). 
Hausman test is a formal χ
2 
significance test that assess whether there are systematic difference 
between random effects and fixed effects coefficients. Consistency of random effect estimators is 
then inferred if there is no systematic difference between the coefficients from the two models, 
given that fixed effects estimators are generally known to be consistent (Wooldridge, 2010). The 
results confirm that there are no systematic differences across the two regression models used for 
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the study’s hypotheses testing. I interpret the consistency of the random effects estimators largely 
due to the study’s careful selection of a comprehensive set of relevant control variables. 
 
Results 
      Table 2 shows the descriptive statistics of all variables. Table 4 presents the results from 
fixed effects models regarding the effects of adopting the institutionally prescribed HR practices 
on innovation over time. Model 1 is the baseline model including all time-variant control 
variables. Other time-constant control variables and firm age were dropped given that fixed 
effects models take account of all individual firm-level effects. Model 2, 3, and 4 add the 
theoretical variables related to testing my hypotheses. The results from log-likelihood ratio test 
(p < 0.01) confirmed that inclusion of all the individual HR variables significantly improved 
model fit. This implies that HR practices included in my study, taken together, are meaningful 
parameters for predicting innovation outcomes. 
      Hypothesis 1 suggested that adoption of flattened hierarchy and open job bidding will 
have more negative effect than adoption of management by objectives and individual 
performance incentives on the Korean manufacturing firms’ innovation following the 1997 Asian 
Financial Crisis. Model 3 in Table 4 shows that the coefficient for Upstream HR Practices is not 
significant, whereas the coefficient for Downstream HR Practices is highly significant and 
positive (p < 0.001, β = 0.281). I performed a formal χ
2 
test to assess whether the difference 
between the two coefficients is significant. The result showed that this difference is significant (p 
< 0.01, χ
2 
(1) = 7.3), providing support for Hypotheses 1. 
      Hypothesis 2a and 2b test my strong form arguments. Hypothesis 2a suggested that 
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adoption of flattened hierarchy and open job bidding will have a negative effect on Korean firms’ 
innovation following the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis. As could be seen in Model 4 in Table 4, 
although the coefficient for Open Job Bidding is not significant, the coefficient for Flattened 
Hierarchy is significant and negative (p < 0.05, β = -0.190). The effect size of -0.190 indicates 
that adoption of flattened hierarchy results in as much as 17.3% (=1-e
-0.190
) decrease in patent 
counts in a given year, on average. 
      In contrast, Hypothesis 2b proposed that adoption of management by objectives and 
individual performance incentives will have a positive effect on Korean firms’ innovation 
following the crisis. In Model 4, the coefficients for Management by Objectives and Individual 
performance incentives are significant and positive (p < 0.05, β = 0.157; p < 0.01, β = 0.190). 
The effect sizes of 0.157 and 0.190 indicate that adoption of management by objectives and 
individual performance incentives result in 17% (=e
0.157
-1) and 20.9% (=e
0.190
-1) increase in 
patent counts for a given year, respectively. These numerical values are quite surprising when 
compared to the more direct technical impact of R&D expense on patent counts. On average, 
doubling the R&D expense amounts to only 5.6% (=2
0.078
-1) increase in patent counts. An effect 
equivalent to adopting management by objectives and individual performance incentives in a 
given year would require increasing R&D expense by as much as 7 and 11 times, respectively.  
      Overall, the results generally support Hypothesis 2. I speculate that open job bidding did 
not have significant effect because it accompanies less substantive changes in organizations. For 
instance, compared to flattened hierarchy’s revolutionary impact throughout the whole 
organization, open job bidding’s impact is more confined to select positions in organizations. I 
interviewed several managers in Korean manufacturing firms and found that open job bidding 
was in fact often implemented only for a limited number of positions. 
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Random Effects Models 
Table 5 presents the coefficient estimates from random effects models. As noted earlier, 
random effects models take account of between-firm variance in coefficient estimates, in 
addition to within-firm variance. In effect, 160 sample firms that were not granted any patents 
during the study period are now included in estimating the regression coefficients. Model 5 is the 
baseline model with control variables including all time-constant as well as time-variant 
variables. Model 6, 7, and 8 add the theoretical variables related to testing my hypotheses. The 
results are basically the same with fixed effects models. In Model 6, the coefficient for The 
Number of Practices Adopted is significant and positive (p < 0.05, β = 0.065). In Model 7, the 
coefficient for Upstream HR Practices is not significant, whereas the coefficient for Downstream 
HR Practices is significant and positive (p < 0.01, β = 0.245). The difference between the two 
coefficients is significant (p < 0.05, χ
2 
(1) = 5.72). In Model 8, the coefficient for Flattened 
Hierarchy is significant and negative (p < 0.05, β = -0.168), whereas the coefficients for 
Management by Objectives and Individual performance incentives are significant and positive (p 
< 0.05, β = 0.139; p < 0.05, β = 0.141). 
 
Conclusion 
      The main purpose of this chapter was to provide empirical evidence on the intended 
consequences of institutional prescriptions and to build theory about the conditions under which 
institutional prescriptions generally achieve the intended outcomes. This chapter also aimed at 
developing and testing theory about the types of practices that are more or less likely to deliver 
intended effects. Can practices prescribed by institutional actors deliver the intended outcomes? 
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The results from this chapter show that the prescription formulated by institutional actors in 
Korea, in general, achieved the intended innovation. While institutional research points out a 
variety of mechanisms that can impede realization of intended consequences (Ansari et al., 2010; 
Bromley & Powell, 2012; Fiss & Zajac, 2004; Oliver, 1991; Scott, 1998), this chapter suggests 
institutional prescriptions can achieve such consequences given the right condition. Those 
conditions I was able to induce are high legitimacy of institutional and organizational elites, 
consistent objectives between the actors involved, and unsustainable status-quos or a sense of 
urgency. The chapter also importantly asked the question about specific types of practices that 
are more or less likely to deliver the intended effects. The results show that the effects of 
prescribed HR practices varied, despite the commonality in their intent to instill market 
rationality and facilitate innovation. The theoretical explanation provided in this chapter is that 
the type of practices that failed to deliver the intended effects was harder to reconcile with the 
existing institutional order, whereas the type of practices delivered the intended effects was more 
feasible to reconcile. An in-depth examination of the mechanism underlying such divergent 
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CHAPTER 3: ORGANIZATIONAL CONSEQUENCES OF INSTITUTIONAL 
PRESCRIPTIONS: A QUALITATIVE CASE STUDY OF FOUR MAJOR 
CONGLOMERATES IN KOREA 
      The previous chapter examined the intended consequences of institutional prescriptions 
in the context of Korean firms following the 1997 Asian Financial crisis. In doing so, it 
developed and tested theory about the types of practices more or less likely to deliver intended 
effects. The general theoretical argument was that the practices are more likely to yield their 
intended benefits when they can be reconciled with the existing institutional order of 
organizations. Chapter 3 aims to provide a deeper understanding of the mechanism underlying 
the divergent effects of practices through a qualitative examination of four specific organizations 
in Korea. It also attempts to complement the previous chapter by providing evidence about the 
practices organizations actually adopted and their organizational and innovation ramifications. In 
order to do so, this chapter raises the following exploratory questions: 1) How did these four 
organizations respond to institutional prescriptions? Which practices did they specifically adopt 
or reject? 2) How did their adoption of prescribed practices specifically impact the existing 
institutional order and organizational life? Additionally, the chapter compares the four 
organizations and draws careful inferences about the relationship between the practices 
organizations adopted and innovation outcomes. 
      The four specific organizations examined in this chapter are Samsung, Hyundai, LG, and 
SK. Samsung, Hyundai, LG, and SK are the four largest family-owned conglomerates (i.e. 
Chaebols) in Korea and are accordingly featured in this study. As of 1997, total sales of these 
four largest conglomerates constituted up to 45% of the whole Korean economy in terms of 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and increased up to 52% by the year of 2009 (Statistics Korea, 
2015). As such, these four conglomerates altogether constitute a major share of the Korean 
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economy and society. While these conglomerates are primarily economic institutions, they also 
had farther reaching social and cultural significance. They are often likened to “total institutions” 
(Goffman, 1961), where their presence in the Korean society stretched to include private 
university sponsorships, foundation of medical schools and general hospitals, scholarship funds, 
art and cultural institutes, professional sports teams, and so forth.  
      An important feature that makes Korean conglomerates particularly appealing for the 
purpose of this dissertation is their similarity in terms of organizing principles and practices in 
use, organizational culture, core competency, and industry portfolio before the 1997 Asian 
Financial Crisis. Such convenient analytical property is mainly due to Korea’s short 
developmental history and homogenous technological/cultural environment, compared to 
conglomerates in the US (Guillén, 2000, Khanna & Rivkin, 2001, Morck, 2010). When 
compared to conglomerates in other East Asian countries (e.g. Keiretsu in Japan, Medium-sized 
enterprises in Taiwan), the Korean counterparts are more usefully tractable because they existed 




Growth of Korean Conglomerates before the Crisis (1962 - 1997)       
      Before the 1960s, South Korea hardly recovered from the ruins of the Korean War (1950-
1953). After 1962, Korea started its planned economic development when Major General Chung 
Hee Park took over regime through a coup d'état. Park regime’s (1962-1979) interest in 
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legitimizing its military control interlocked with the United States’ concern in building South 
Korea as the frontline of the Cold War. Generous aids granted by United States were the seeds 
for a few entrepreneurs selected by the Korean government to drive an export oriented industrial 
policy, and ultimately, accumulate capital (Amsden, 1989; Cumings, 1997). Because of the lack 
of natural resources and small internal market, the military regime believed aggressive 
exportation is the only way to economic development. Amidst institutional voids (i.e. 
underdeveloped factor market), the selected entrepreneurs were able to vertically integrate and 
diversify into a variety of other capital intensive industries and rapidly grow into large-scale 
family-owned conglomerates, or Chaebols (Guillén, 2000; Khanna & Rivkin, 2001). By the 
1980s, Korean conglomerates were able to compete globally in industries such as construction, 
shipbuilding, automobile, petroleum-chemical, machinery, electronics, and home appliance. 
Korean conglomerates swiftly enlarged their scale and scope by relying on debt capital with 
favorable interest rate backed by the government, internalizing non-bank financial institutions, 
and using inter-affiliate loans and debt guarantees (Chang, 2003). Importantly by using cross-
shareholding ownership structure, family-owners maintained their unchallenged control rights 
over the whole group, which well exceeded their cash flow rights (Chang & Hong, 2000). In 
particular, through circular equity investment among multiple affiliate firms, the family-owners 
were able to secure corporate control with minimum dilution amidst the growth. 
      As Korean conglomerates have contributed to building an industrialized nation within 
only three decades (1960s-1980s), western scholars praised the South Korean case as an ideal 
model of developmental state in which local industrial elites were effectively disciplined in 
exchange for the favorable protection and policy support provided by the government (Evans, 
1995). However, it is also true that the family-owners and government bureaucrats & politicians 
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gradually formed an interlocking elite class through marriage ties (Useem, 1979). For this reason, 
throughout the industrialization history of Korea, the civil society has engaged in persistent 
resistance against the elite-class domination exercised by the authoritarian military government-
Chaebol complex. 
 
The 1997 Asian Financial Crisis and the Economic Reform 
      Near the end of 1997, the Korean government exhausted the nation’s foreign currency 
reserve. Subsequently, national currency was devalued by half, and interest rate soared up to 27%. 
During the turmoil, a relief fund was provided by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the 
IMF subsequently enforced a set of market-oriented reform in corporate governance, financial 
institutions, and capital market sector. The Korean government, in turn, strongly effectuated the 
guidelines of IMF toward Chaebols, including restructuration of cross-shareholding ownership 
structure, reduction of debt-to-equity ratio below 200%, abolishment of inter-affiliate debt 
guarantees, and divestiture of unrelated businesses (Chang 2003; Kim, 2010). These guidelines 
were altogether aimed at limiting the scope of the conglomerates and the influence of their 
family owners.  
      Various economic and social actors against the family-owned conglomerates played their 
role in supporting the reform. For instance, foreign institutional investors (e.g. investment banks, 
private equity and hedge funds) raised concern that the peculiarity of cross-shareholding 
ownership structure of the Chaebols is the root cause of “The Korea Discount” (Economist, 
2012). Government officials shaped opinion that Chaebols are ultimately responsible for the 
crisis due to their inefficiencies and reckless expansion into unrelated industries. Moreover, 
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NGOs, civil society activists, and labor unions in the left circles of the Korean political stratum 
also enthusiastically took their part in the name of minority shareholder rights. With a belief that 
more market discipline applied toward family-owners of the conglomerates would translate into 
more equal distribution of social utility, they advocated the reform of “Chaebol ancien régime” 
(Bae et al., 2002). Under the slogan of “blessing in disguise”, ironically, they actively coalesced 
with foreign institutional investors and neoliberal government officials. Although some scholars 
argued for a social contract regarding an exchange between the control rights of family-owners 
and their fulfillment of social welfare duties (Chang et al. 2012), the Korean civil society was 
more anxious about the conglomerates increasingly becoming a surrogate of the Korean 
economy and society. In this regard, one of the largest shares of social agenda during the time 
involved the debate on the issue of “economic democratization”. 
      It was against this backdrop where the new market-oriented HR practices prescribed 
mainly as technical solution to competitiveness problems of Korean firms further gained 
normative and cultural support throughout the society. The market rationality the reform entailed 
and the public antagonism toward the family-owned conglomerates influenced Korean people’s 
conception of ideal workplace governance and employee-labor relations (Song, 2009). For 
instance, graduates of Korean prestigious universities considered working in foreign investment 
banks and consulting firms than in major Chaebols to be a more advanced and “cool” form of 
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Methods 
      The study is based on qualitative and quantitative data collected from sources including 
semi-structured face-to-face interviews of 28 current or retired senior executives and middle 
managers from the four conglomerates (i.e. 6-8 respondents per company), historical documents 
(i.e. newspapers, magazines), annual reports, and financial statements. The interviews were 
conducted from 2013 to 2014. The average tenure of the interviewees equaled to 17 years as of 
2013. The long tenure ensured that the responses were based on close experience within their 
organization. The interviewees were selected based on “purposive” sampling methods (Straits & 
Singleton, 2011). To increase the representativeness of the interviewees, the study worked to 
maximize variance among the interviewees’ judgement of their group when selecting the 
interviewees. For instance, the interviewees represented diverse educational, regional, and 
functional backgrounds. 
      The interview asked about the practices adopted after the financial crisis and their 
organizational ramifications. For example, I asked: 
“What practices did your company adopt in functional domains such as 
organization/job design, promotion/leadership development, evaluation, and 
compensation following the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis?” 
“What are some other market-oriented changes that your company undertook after the 
financial crisis?” 
“How did such changes impact your organizational life and the whole organizational 
culture?” 
Notably, interviewees’ responses about the practices adopted in their organization converged 
reliably (i.e., average rate of agreement of 94%). The responses were also triangulated through 
historical documents so as to validate the interviewees’ judgments (Van de Ven, 2007).       




      Practices Adopted & Organizational Ramifications. According to the interviews, LG 
proactively adopted flattened hierarchy, open job bidding, management by objectives, and 
individual performance incentives to solve the problems it faced after the 1997 Asian Financial 
Crisis. In particular, LG eliminated the assistant and the associate manager level. It also staffed 
seven out of eight top executive positions with foreigners (i.e., non-Korean nationals) in its 
largest Electronics affiliate. Going further, LG experimented with delegating the group’s 
centralized control to each affiliates, where the Headquarter of LG group limited its function to 
portfolio management.  
      These changes apparently had an effect on the institutional order of LG and the 
organizational life of its people. One manager of LG specifically commented about how the 
changes have impacted the common identity and consciousness of the ordinary employees at LG.: 
 “All we talk about here is Samsung when we gather around. We have been calling it 
“The B group” here in LG for a long time. It can be even said a part of our job is to 
think about Samsung. There is no longer a feeling of such a thing as a “LG-man” like 
in the case of the “Samsung-man”. We lost a sense of unity or order [M1].” 
A senior executive of LG Electronics also complainingly reported that his company “almost 
outsourced the strategy formulation function to Mckinsey & Company in 2007 and marginalized 
LG’s own top managers [M2].” He went on in commenting the organizational ramification of 
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such change: 
 “After Mckinsey came in like an occupation troop, the CEO suddenly started talking 
about us being a “marketing leader”. All those buzz about marketing created much 
confusion among us. I thought we were a technology company and should have 
remained as one. Many competent engineering minded executives felt offended and 
left the company then [M2].” 
Other interviewees generally made similar remarks concerning how those changes impacted their 
organizational life. For example, “miserable [M3]”, “feeling alienated [M4]”, “loss of meaning 
[M5]”, and “unhappy [M6]” were some of the sentiments they conveyed about the changes at LG. 
The loss of meaning that M5 mentioned was particularly informative as he had an elite track 
record in LG after the crisis (e.g., promoted to a top manager in 2004). 
      Innovation Outcomes. LG electronics was unable to substantively innovate, for instance, 
in the emerging smartphone business in 2009 (Fortune, 2011). After losing about half of their 
market share in the mobile businesses, the family-owners of LG reinstated control and 
terminated Mckinsey & Company’s advisory role. Despite this, LG was unable to recover from 
the decline. Archival data sources show that the gap in global sales, compared to Samsung, 
widened to more than five times as of 2009. LG also faced a downturn in firm size ranking. In 
2001, LG’s size in terms of total sales was ranked at the second among the four major 
conglomerates in Korea, but it became the smallest by 2009. Although LG’s entry into the 
electronics industry preceded Samsung by a decade and had been considered a rival if not the 
beater of Samsung before the crisis, LG increasingly came to be a local player after the crisis. 
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SK  
      Practices Adopted & Organizational Ramifications. Similar to LG, the interviews 
reveal that SK adopted all four of the new HR practices. One notable change that SK made was 
appointment of professional managers with foreign MBA degrees and consulting background 
from prestigious firms to key strategic positions.  
      These changes seemed to have impacted the existing institutional order that previously 
bound the employees of SK together. A SK manager said that “SK is becoming a somewhat two-
tier organization, comprised of fast-track professional managers and slow-track second-class 
citizens [M7].” These changes also had a seeming influence on the daily life of the people at SK. 
For instance, another manager of SK further lamented: 
 “We have worked for a long time in SK. You know, the company is treating us old 
soldiers as shit. Our track records of the battles we’ve fought and all those victorious 
wounds no longer matter here. All it matters now are those foreign, cool label 
[prestigious MBA degrees and brand name consulting firms]. They are taking away the 
important strategic positions that guarantee promotion. I am sitting next to the 
bathroom and not sure when I will be done [M8].” 
One senior manager describes the situation after the crisis when these changes took place. 
 “All of our crews tried to achieve our exportation numbers when our first generation 
Chairmen were present [Jong-gun Choi; Jong-hyun Chey, - 1997]. We felt we’re doing 
something for the future of our nation and our sons then. After Tae-won Chey [son of Jong-
hyun Chey] took SK’s crown in 1997, we became a totally different company. A lot of us 
had to feel a severe loss of meaning when Chairman Tae-won Chey drove SK to a different 
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direction. He did his studies at the University of Chicago and did not respect folks who 
studied at Seoul, Yonsei, or Korea University. His world is simply different from ours [M9].”  
Other three interviewees from SK also commented on how changes at SK negatively impacted 
their organizational life and culture. For example, two mangers commented about the “toxic 
culture [M10, M11]” at SK after the crisis, and one manager explained how he “loathed all those 
fancy things [M12]” went on at SK. 
      Innovation Outcomes. During the study period, SK failed to innovate and perform 
effectively in exportation-heavy industries such as electronics and machinery. The Group’s 
global sales decreased accordingly. At the same time, SK began to concentrate on industries that 
granted a stable source of monopolistic rent (e.g. oil refinery, mobile telecommunication, internet 
service). SK also entered into domestic consumer industries that were previously occupied by 






      Practices Adopted & Organizational Ramifications. In contrast to LG and SK, 
responses from the interviews suggest that Samsung took a more conservative approach in 
adopting the new practices. In particular, Samsung maintained its extensive and centralized 
hierarchy and promotion based on commitment. At the same time, however, Samsung adopted 
market-oriented HR practices in the domains of evaluation and compensation. 
                                                 
9
 Ironically, SK was the most enthusiastic conglomerate to engage in corporate social responsibility activities with 
establishment of a dedicated board of directors committee. 
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      A more selective approach in adopting the new practices appeared to have helped sustain 
the existing institutional order of Samsung. A Samsung manager said that “only pure blue-
blooded Samsung-man [Samsung’s symbolic color is blue] who served his entire career in 
Samsung is eligible for promotion to top-executive positions [M13].” He called himself a “loyal 
vassal [M13]” while describing his sole commitment to the Samsung group throughout his career. 
Despite this continuity, Samsung’s adoption of management by objectives and individual 
performance incentives has triggered substantive changes. For example, a HR manager at 
Samsung told that “under Samsung’s unique profit sharing and revolutionary incentive system, it 
is not uncommon for a junior employee to be compensated as much as 50% more than his 
supervisor [M14]”. A junior manager I interviewed actually told how he liked such changes.  
 “There was one time when I got to know that I received a bigger pay check then my 
boss. I really felt that I was being compensated for my hard work. The good part was 
that my boss did not recognize that I was getting more than him. The bad part was 
when he ultimately heard this fact from one of my colleague. But to my surprise, he 
did not seem offended but even happily asked me to buy a nice drink [M15].” 
I speculate the surprisingly positive attitude of the boss in the above quote was possible due to 
the temporary nature of individual performance incentives (i.e., one year). Individual 
performance incentives are formally bonuses, and therefore do not amount into permanent 
changes in the salary. In addition to that, it could have been possible there was an alignment 
between the objectives of the two people. A good performance of a junior can be attributed to the 
managerial capability of the supervisor by the top management.   
      The way Samsung adopted the new market-oriented practices appears to have shaped the 
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life of its employees quite differently than that of employees at LG or Sk. One senior executive 
manager of Samsung said: 
 “Whenever I go to gatherings of my old school comrades, they call me Samsung-
man. I also think the same way. I am actually very proud to be one. You know that we 
are very serious about our culture, HR programs, and those extensive boot-camps we 
do to make our newcomers think and feel the same. It really injects the blue-blood. I 
also experienced it myself when I was a newcomer to Samsung a couple decades ago. 
It was from there and onwards my cohorts drove Samsung and brought it to today 
[M16].” 
While one interviewee shared negative feelings about the changes (i.e., “I was not sure where 
Samsung was headed to [M17]”), the responses of other three interviewees generally converged 
with the above interviewees’ positive attitude toward Samsung’s post-crisis changes. For instance, 
two managers commented on how they “liked the new incentive system [M18, M19]”, and 
another manager told how “Samsung improved its culture and gained momentum [M20]” by 
those changes. 
      Innovation Outcomes. Samsung achieved substantive technological innovation in 
industries such as semiconductors, mobile phones, display, and electronics. Such innovation led 
to new highs in exportation (i.e., 90% of sales). After the financial crisis, Samsung rose as a 
renowned electronics manufacturer and a prosperous global player. 
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Hyundai  
      Practices Adopted & Organizational Ramifications. Hyundai initially experienced the 
severe adverse impacts of the financial crisis and the economic reform. In 2001, after Chairman 
Juyung Chung’s death, the sons of the Chairman were not able or no longer willing to maintain 
the unity of the whole conglomerate. In effect, Hyundai was divided by each son into subgroups 
of Hyundai Asan, Hyundai Motors, Hyundai Heavy Industry, and several others. Despite the 
adversity imposed against the whole “Hyundai Empire”, Hyundai Motors, led by Chairman 
Mong-koo Chung, was the one able to survive and acquire many remaining affiliates of Hyundai. 
Thus, the main focus of this section is Hyundai Motors.  
       Responses from the interviews indicate that Hyundai Motors made a rather cautious 
approach in adopting new market-oriented practices, as in the case of Samsung. Hyundai Motors 
maintained extensive and centralized hierarchy, promotion based on commitment, while adopting 
management by objectives and individual performance incentives.  
      As in the case of Samsung, such a cautious approach in adopting the new practices helped 
Hyundai maintain its existing institutional order. For example, one Hyundai Motors manager 
mentioned a story about how the son of Hyundai Motors’ Chairman (who is the vice-chairman) 
made a strong drive toward strengthening its marketing function by bringing in his fellow 
consultants from Monitor Group [M21]. However, newspaper sources indicate that such drive 
did not contradict incumbent managers’ job security. Specifically, Hyundai Motors continued its 
distinguished lifetime employment policy, with average tenure of full-time employees equaling 
to 19.5 years in 2009. This was the longest among Korean conglomerates, even though it was 
Hyundai that faced the most serious decline after the crisis. One Hyundai managers proudly 
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confirmed that  
 “From the moment we entered Hyundai, we did not ever think about leaving. 
Hyundai is not those typical “up-or-out” companies. We serve for Hyundai, and 
Hyundai takes care of you all, including your child’s higher education and medical 
expenses [M22].”  
Such cautious ways of adopting new practices could have molded Hyundai Motors’ unique 
culture and organizational life. One senior executive manager of Hyundai Motors said: 
“I truly respect Chairman Juyung Chung and his son Mong-koo Chung. Juyung 
Chung, the King Chairman [often referred as the King Chairman to differentiate from 
his sons], was the hero of Hyundai and South Korea. He made all that hopes of the 
economic development in Korea a reality. You know, he created the automobile and 
shipbuilding industry in Korea literally out of nothing. The current Chairman Mong-
koo Chung resembles the King Chairman’s characters the most among all other 
sons. ... Like the King Chairman, Chairman Mong-koo Chung does severely insult me 
at times and even kicks my shanks and joints, fairly occasionally. I mean, really hard 
that I could barely walk for a week. But I do understand and accept this. Even if I 
made mistakes, he will never let me go, still give me chance, and continue granting 
important and challenging projects. He considers me as a member of his clan [M23].” 
While two interviewees conveyed their negative sentiments about the changes (i.e., “sending 
mixed messages to the people [M24]”; “disguising real changes [M25]”), the responses of other 
three interviewees were generally more positive. For instance, “feeling a sense of continuity 
[M26]”, “secure [M27]”, and “honor [M28]” were some phrases these managers used to explain 
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their post-crisis life at Hyundai. 
      Innovation Outcomes. Hyundai Motors achieved substantive technological innovation 
in the automobile industry. During the study period, Hyundai was able to finally develop home 
grown engines and obtain technological independence from Japanese makers such as Mitsubishi. 
Hyundai Motors emerged as one of the most successful global automobile enterprises, ranked 
within the Top 5 of the industry in 2009. In 2001, Hyundai Motors’ size was ranked at the bottom 
among the four major conglomerates in Korea, but it gradually surpassed LG and SK to become 
the second largest by 2009. It also recovered the previous scale and scope of pre-crisis Hyundai. 
       
Implications 
 
Emergent Patterns from Comparison between the Four Conglomerates 
     As summarized in Table 2, the four conglomerates adopted the prescribed market-oriented 
HR practices differently. While LG and SK adopted all of the prescribed HR practices in a 
wholesale manner, Samsung and Hyundai selectively adopted management by objectives and 
individual performance incentives. The study also reveals preliminary association between the 
choice Korean conglomerates made in adopting the practices and their innovativeness after the 
crisis. On the one hand, it appears the conglomerates that adopted the practices in a wholesale 
way failed in innovation, faced downturn in global sales and firm size ranking, and degenerated 
into local players or monopolistic rent seekers (i.e., LG, SK). On the other hand, the 
conglomerates that adopted certain practices in more selective manner achieved substantive 
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technological development, resurged as prosperous global players, and continued to fulfil 
national developmental duties by being able to maintain export-oriented industry portfolio (i.e., 
Samsung, Hyundai). 
 
Disruption of the Existing Institutional Order in LG and SK  
      Earlier in Chapter 2, the dissertation suggested maintenance or disruption of the existing 
institutional order as one mechanism behind the practices’ divergent effects on innovation. The 
qualitative study in this chapter provided evidence of such mechanism. Upstream practices such 
as flattened hierarchy and open job bidding were particularly prone to undermine the existing 
order of bureaucracy and solidarity as it triggered more internal tensions. Downstream practices, 
on the contrary, alleviated possible tensions and made realization of the practices’ intended 
benefits more feasible. While LG and SK adopted the prescribed HR practices as part of sincere 
strategic action attempted at facilitating innovation, it appears they were less aware of the 
negative impacts of the upstream practices or how they would undermine their existing 
institutional order. 
 
Maintenance and Evolution of the Existing Institutional Order in Samsung and Hyundai 
      The qualitative study shows that Samsung and Hyundai took a more cautious and 
conservative approach in adopting the prescribed practices. Specifically, they adopted 
management by objectives and individual performance incentives while excluding flattened 
hierarchy and open job bidding. Selective adoption of downstream practices helped maintenance 
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of the existing institutional order and further stimulated its healthy evolution. While “managerial 
Samsung” had been a popular cliché epitomizing the bureaucratic culture of Samsung before the 
crisis (Siegel & Chang, 2009), my conjecture is that augmenting this with market-oriented 
compensation system enabled formation of a new order of “dynamic bureaucracy”. It is perhaps 
through this way the gigantic group still continued to hold together under Chairman Lee, while 
swiftly responding to market demands at the same time. When compared to other conglomerates’ 
response to the prescription, Samsung’s post-crisis appearance as one of the most prosperous 
global players cannot be easily reduced to mere coincidence. Likewise in Hyundai, the market 
rationality injected a healthy stimulus to the inherited culture of “militant solidarity” (Steers, 
1999) and perhaps contributed to creation of a new order of “professional solidarity”. 
 
Conclusion 
      The main objective of this chapter was to complement chapter 2 by providing an in-depth 
qualitative examination of the proposed mechanism about reconciliation of practices with the 
existing institutional order of Korean firms. To do so, the chapter examined the actual patterns of 
adoption in significant large-scale organizations in Korea. It also delved deeper into the practices’ 
organizational ramifications and innovation outcomes. While the qualitative nature of this 
chapter helped to understand the deeper psychology and organizational dynamics inside actual 
organizations, this very feature set boundaries to what we can learn from this chapter. The 
patterns found in this chapter are not causal inferences and cannot be generalized to other 
settings. A general discussion of the implications of this dissertation is the subject of the next 
chapter. 
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CHAPTER 4: DISCUSSION 
      The main purpose of this dissertation was threefold. First was highlighting the dual nature 
of practices and directing attention to the intended organizational consequences of institutional 
prescriptions. Second was providing empirical evidence on such consequences and further 
building theory about the conditions under which institutional prescriptions generally achieve the 
intended outcomes. Third was developing and testing theory about the types of practices that are 
more or less likely to deliver intended effects. In this dissertation, I systematically examined the 
intended consequences of institutional prescription in one appealing context of Korean 
manufacturing firms that were pressured to adopt a comprehensive set of new market-oriented 
HR practices to facilitate innovation. I found evidence that the prescription formulated by 
institutional actors in Korea, in general, achieved the intended benefits of advancing the 
competitive niche of Korean firms. Based on this evidence, I induced potential theoretical 
reasons why the institutional prescriptions could have worked in Korea. I also found that the 
prescribed practices significantly varied in delivering their intended effects, despite the 
commonality in their intent to instill market principle and facilitate innovation. An in-depth 
examination of the mechanism behind such divergent effects was conducted through a qualitative 
comparative case study of four major conglomerates in Korea. 
 
Implications for Institutional Theory 
      I contributed to institutional theory by highlighting the dual nature of practices and 
directing attention to the intended consequences of institutional prescriptions. By doings so, my 
dissertation identified a new problem domain that merits attention from institutional theorists. In 
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particular, it showed that institutional research can productively enter into practical problems of 
managing organizational change and sustaining their effectiveness. To date, institutional theory 
has been disproportionately concerned with diffusion processes and the factors that facilitate 
adoption, decoupling and symbolism, and adoptions’ implications for organizational legitimacy. 
Through my focus extending to the intended consequences, especially those reflecting practices’ 
ramification on internal institutional processes, I was able to bring organizations and their fate in 
the institutionalization process back to the institutional theoretical purview. While field-level 
institutional processes, organizations’ adoption of practices and factors that facilitate diffusion, 
legitimacy judgments of external audiences, and taken-for-granted organizational action has been 
the central phenomenon of interest since the theory’s “neo-institutional” turn (DiMaggio & 
Powell, 1991), a concern about organizational problems, organizations’ internal institutional 
processes, and mindful organizational action have been native to institutional theory (Selznick, 
1957). It is not a coincidence that my answers to the questions about effectiveness of 
institutionally prescribed practices all built on existing works of institutional theory. In fact, it is 
institutional theory’s devoted concern with the powerful influence of the broader institutional 
environment that makes the theory so essential for theorizing organizational action that may 
mediate such environmental influences for better or worse (Sewell, 2005). This dissertation was 
one small attempt, and I believe future institutional research can productively enter into practical 
and fundamental problems of managing organizations and sustaining their effectiveness. 
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Implications for Organizational Adopters and Institutional Prescribers 
      The dissertation also developed theory and provided evidence about the conditions under 
which institutional prescriptions achieve the intended outcomes and the type of practices that are 
more or less likely to deliver intended effects. In particular, my focus on institutional 
characteristics of prescribed practices and their possibility of reconciliation with the existing 
institutional order enabled assessment of practices’ varying implications. After all, the prescribed 
practices were neither equally performative “tool kits” nor equally non-viable solutions in 
delivering the intended effects (Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Swidler, 1986). For organizations, these 
findings inform the consequential choice of adopting institutionally prescribed practices, or more 
generally, their successful adaptation when compliance and change is advised by prominent 
institutional actors. For institutional actors, this dissertation illuminates how institutional actors 
could avoid instituting undermining changes and prescriptions. However benevolent their intent 
might be, it is the serious consideration of the possibility of reconciling the prescriptions with the 
existing institutional order that enables policy makers to achieve their valued ends on behalf of 
organizations and society. 
      In prescribing the new HR practices, the IMF and Korean government believed that 
replacement of the existing institutional order with market principles will promote innovation, 
advance the competitive niche of the Korean manufacturing industry, and rationalize the whole 
society (Chang, 2003). Academics and social activists from more left circles of the Korean 
political stratum went further to argue that the existing institutional order characterized by the 
combination of bureaucracy and solidarity is merely an entrenched control apparatus (Barker, 
1993; Burawoy, 1979), where the new market principles will liberate the people from the “ancien 
régime” of total mobilization. However, the effectiveness of prescribed practices was not 
    55 
independent from the existing institutional order and how they were actually experienced by the 
ordinary members. Whatsoever the institutional and civil society elites argued, it was ultimately 
the grass-root people and employees who got to live with the practices with mundane reality. As 
my findings suggest, the firms that took a more conservative step in incorporating the new 
market-oriented practices were the ones that were able to innovate and transform themselves into 
more successful economic organizations that competed globally. 
 
Implications for Economic Development of Nations 
      Finally, my dissertation provides insights into general industrialization process and 
economic development of nations. In Korean firms and especially the larger scale conglomerates, 
achieving innovation and economic development have been regarded as a social contract if not a 
moral obligation. From the outset, Korean firms were able to obtain competitiveness in the 
global economy through generous industrial policy of the government (e.g., government-
guaranteed debt capital with favorable interest rate, low labor costs, high tariff) (Chang, 2008). 
Throughout this industrialization process, some academics further argued that the civil society 
and the people endured much of the economic and social burden (Yoon & Chae, 2011). Korean 
firms’ success and failure in achieving innovation therefore had further reaching ramifications on 
their ability to fulfill the duties of national economic development. For instance, while Samsung 
and Hyundai fulfilled national developmental duties through continued exportation, LG and SK 
failed to innovate and ultimately betrayed their social contract if not moral obligations. This 
finding partly responds to an intriguing question about whether large scale conglomerates in 
developing countries are avatars versus anachronisms (Granovetter, 2005) or paragons versus 
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parasites (Khanna & Yafeh, 2007) for a nation’s economic development. As a matter of fact, 
Samsung and Hyundai are a few exceptional conglomerates from developing countries that were 
able to concentrate on export-oriented industries rather than industries that naturally grant 
monopolistic rent (i.e., oil refinery, mobile telecommunication). As of 2019, SK is expected to 
exceed Hyundai in total sales ranking in Korea (i.e., second largest in Korea). In 2003, SK was 
below Hyundai and LG, marked as 4th in Korea. My long-term prediction is that the Korean 
economy and society will come to a full cycle and approach closer to those in Latin America and 
Southeast Asia when a conglomerate like SK ultimately exceeds Samsung. 
      Particularizing as the context of my dissertation may be, at the same time, it could be 
usefully located in a more universalizing account. The three principles present in this study were 
bureaucracy, solidarity, and market, and these are by no means unique to the Korean context. 
Instead, they are known-to-be mutually exclusive and exhaustive social drivers of modernity that 
at least dates back to Max Weber, Émile Durkheim, and Herbert Spencer, respectively (Parsons, 
1937)
10
. Furthermore, contemporary social theorists who have studied modern capitalism from 
organizational viewpoints acknowledge that presence of all three principles rather than pure 
archetypes are characteristic of most industrialized nations (Block & Evans, 2005; Schneiberg & 
Bartley, 2008). In this regard, the Korean context is but one setting where all three principles 
                                                 
10
 First, in his masterpiece essays in Economy and Society, Weber (1946) interpreted modernity or rationalization of 
a society from officialdom (office holding taken as a vocation or a meaningful end in its own right) produced by 
state bureaucracy. Second, in The Division of Labor in Society, Durkheim (1997) speculated common consciousness 
of a society as the moral basis of division of labor and concurrent development of modern (i.e., organic) form of 
solidarity from more primitive (i.e., mechanistic) one. Third, Herbert Spencer (1896) saw the progress of every 
nation in evolvement of compulsive “militant society” (i.e., state, war) into voluntary “industrial society” (i.e., 
economy, capitalism), in which free-market, wage-labor, and meritocratic individual was the key to increasing 
differentiation and integration of previously homogenous social functions. 
    57 
played out ideally within a condensed period of time of five decades
11
. Korea’s continued 
developmental success after the crisis could be attributed to the presence, integrity, as well as the 




      My dissertation is limited to the specific practices that were prominent in the empirical 
context. The particular organizational practices prescribed to Korean firms were HR practices. 
One important feature of HR practices is their greater potential for internal organizational 
relevance (Selznick, 1969). In contrast, corporate governance practices, which have been a prima 
facie site of neo-institutional theory, have been identified as having more relevance with 
legitimacy judgments of external audiences and as a domain in which the problem of 
reconciliation could be dealt through management of cultural symbols (Westphal & Zajac, 2013). 
It is perhaps this distinguishing feature of HR practices that entitles it to be the quintessential 
linchpin between institutions and organizations. I also developed theory based on a strategically 
chosen research site (Merton, 1987) with prospect for important and observable consequences of 
adopting institutionally prescribed practices. My theoretical emphasis on internal institutional 
processes and sustaining institutional order over external evaluations and skillful use of cultural 
symbols thus has limited applications when organizational objectives are necessarily ill-defined, 
as in the case of most cultural organizations.  
                                                 
11
 For instance in the US, bureaucracy was established during the 1930s Fordist and World War II era, meritocracy 
during the 1960s civil rights movement, and solidarity during the 1970-80s recession and influence from Japanese 
management system (Barley & Kunda, 1992; Baron, et al., 1986). 
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      Finally, my dissertation is bound by the uniqueness of the empirical context. The complex 
historical interplay among different principles of managing organizations generates multiple 
routes to building effective organizational institutions and achieving economic development (i.e., 
“variety of capitalism”). The final analysis of prescriptions and practices that works and does not 
thus remains a unique methodological individual (Weber, 1946). It was my ontological position 
of pragmatism that guided me to evaluate the mystery of success and failure essentially on a case 
by case basis. Future research might deliver more insights by examining how prescriptions and 
practices could be adopted to build and sustain successful organizations and achieve valued 
economic and social ends in other contexts. I believe this dissertation has opened up useful 
avenues for bridging the gap between institutional theory and the problem of managing 
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APPENDIX: ANTECEDENTS OF PRACTICE ADOPTION: FACTORS INFLUENCING 
KOREAN FIRMS’ ADOPTION OF PRESCRIBED HR PRACTICES 
      Having examined the consequences of institutional prescriptions, questions about the 
antecedents of adoption or variation among organizations in their adoption of prescribed 
practices can be naturally raised. The purpose of this appendix is to provide empirical findings 
about the factors that influenced Korean firms’ adoption of the prescribed HR practices. By 
doing so, this appendix is able to assess which organizations are more or less likely to adopt 
practices prescribed by institutional actors. It can also assess which organizations specifically 
adopted the better type of practices while excluding the worse, following up on findings from 
Chapter 2.  
      The following questions provide guidance for exploring the empirical patterns that will 
emerge in this appendix. For instance, which firms generally adopted the prescribed HR practices? 
Which firms more selectively adopted the effective downstream HR practices (i.e., management 
by objectives, individual performance incentives), while excluding the ineffective upstream 
practices (i.e., flattened hierarchy, open job bidding)? In contrast, which firms selectively yet less 
intelligently adopted the upstream HR practices, while excluding the downstream HR practices? 
Finally, which firms adopted all of the four prescribed practices in more wholesale manner? 
      The existing institutional literature points out a variety of factors that affect organizations’ 
adoption or rejection of practices and thereby shape the broader diffusion process (Davis & 
Greve, 1997; Edelman, 1990; 1992; Greenwood, Diaz, Li & Lorente, 2010; Lounsbury, 2007; 
Sutton & Dobbin, 1996; Tolbert & Zucker, 1983; Westphal & Zajac, 1994; Zajac & Kraatz, 
1993). The most prominent among those factors are timing of adoption, visibility to the public, 
and local environment. Institutional theorists have examined the tendency of adoption to 
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accelerate with elapse of time throughout the institutionalization process (Tolbert & Zucker, 
1983). Organizations with larger size and publicly traded organizations are known to be 
generally more visible to the public and therefore more responsive to institutional pressures 
(Lounsbury, 2007). Local environmental context (i.e., industry) can differently shape 
organizations’ tendency to adopt or reject practices as their needs often differ (Zajac & Kraatz, 
1993). Accordingly in this study, elapsed time since the financial crisis, organizational age and 
size, public trade status, affiliated industry, profitability, and R&D intensity are considered as 
factors predicting Korean firms’ adoption of the prescribed HR practices. 
      In addition to these factors, the influence of various agents unique to this particular 
context is importantly considered. Soon after the crisis unfolded in Korea, a new class of agents 
such as short-term foreign investors, non-owner professional CEOs, HR committee in the board 
of directors, and consulting firms established timely footholds in Korea. These agents, or the new 
market rationality “ambassadors”, established solid foundations in Korea through the reform in 
the corporate governance sector and were effectively at the nexus of organizations and 
institutional forces in Korea. Through the influence of these agents as well as the organizations’ 
determination to change their strategic orientation toward innovation, the new HR practices were 
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Methods 
 
Sample and Data 
      This appendix is generally based on the same sample and data used in Chapter 2. One 
difference is that the study period is limited to seven years from year 2002 to 2008. This is due to 
lack of data before the year 2002 for the main antecedent variables. The sample consists of 511 
firms over seven years, which aggregate into 3575 firm-year observation. In regression analyses, 
7 firms that did not adopt any of the HR practices during the seven year period were excluded, 
amounting into to 504 firms. 
 
Measures of Variables 
      I provide description of the antecedent variables and different variants of practice 
adoption variables used as dependent variables in this appendix. 
      Antecedents of Practice Adoption. The antecedents of practice adoption were measured 
through questionnaires asking key respondents about their company over the past three years for 
the 2005 survey and past two years for the 2007 and 2009 surveys
12
. Setting Strategic 
Orientation toward Innovation was captured by a questionnaire that asked senior managers to 
identify their companies’ strategic orientation from the following response set: (1) Attempted to 
secure current market position by improving existing product lines, and did not seek to enter into 
                                                 
12
 The values assigned to years 2002, 2003, 2004; the values assigned to years 2005, 2006; and the values assigned 
to years 2007, 2008 are the same. 
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new market segments or develop new products. (2) Did not seek to take initiatives by means of 
creating new market segments or developing new products, but nevertheless attempted to 
selectively develop new products in response to market leader’s action. (3) Sought to take 
initiatives by creating new market segments or developing new products. Response set (1) is 
assigned the value of 1, indicating least strategic orientation toward innovation; Response set (3) 
is assigned the value of 3, indicating the most strategic orientation toward innovation. Foreign 
Ownership was measured as a binary variable asking its presence in the company’s ownership 
structure. Professional CEO was measured by asking the extent to which corporate control is 
exercised by professional CEO vis-à-vis the owner in a 4 point scale. For example, scale 1 is 
“our firm is controlled by the owner” and scale 4 is “our firm is controlled by a professional 
CEO”. HR Committee in Board of Directors was measured as a binary variable asking its 
presence. HR Consulting was measured by asking whether the company received consulting 
services in the major HR functions of organization/job design, promotion/leadership 
development, evaluation, and compensation. 
      The variables used as controls in Chapter 2 are included to examine their influence on 
adoption of practices. The variables included are Elapsed Time, Firm Age, Firm Size, Publicly 
Traded, Re-established after the Crisis, Industry, Return on Assets, Debt-to-Equity Ratio, 
Sales Growth Rate, and R&D Intensity (R&D expense/Total Sales). The difference compared 
to Chapter 2 is inclusion of Elapsed Time instead of year dummies to take account of the event 
history nature of the dependent variable of this chapter. Additionally, in place of log of R&D 
expense used in Chapter 2, R&D intensity and Sales Growth Rate are included. Also, two 
Publically Traded variables are merged into a single variable. Finally, Re-established after the 
Crisis is simply the Sample Selection Indicator variable used in Chapter 2. 
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      Adoption of Human Resource (HR) Practices. Different practice adoption variables are 
constructed using the same raw information used in Chapter 2. The variable The Number of 
Practices Adopted is created by coding events of adoption with values ranging from zero to four 
(i.e., multiple events), indicating the number of practices a firm adopted in a given year (Allison, 
1982). These multiple events can also appear in a repeated manner (e.g., adoption of one practice 
in one year and adoption of two practices in another year). The variable Selectivity is created by 
assigning separate values to events of adopting upstream practices and to events of adopting 
downstream practices. For cases of adopting multiple upstream and downstream practices in a 
given year, I considered the net number (i.e., the number of downstream practices adopted - the 
number of upstream practices adopted). In effect, the variable consists of four categories of 
events: non-adoption or equal number of adopting upstream and downstream practices in a given 
year, adoption of two upstream practices (i.e., “worst”), adoption of one upstream practice (i.e., 
“worse”), adoption of one downstream practice (i.e., better), and adoption of two downstream 
practices (i.e., “best”). Finally, a separate set of variables that account for adoption of each of the 
four practices (i.e., flattened hierarchy, open job bidding, management by objectives, individual 
performance incentives) are created. In all practice adoption variables, the observations are 
dropped when adoption event(s) are known to be complete, as the organization is no longer “at 
risk” of adopting (Allison, 1982). 
 
Regression Analyses 
      Event history analyses were conducted by using discrete-time models to take account of 
the study’s panel (i.e., split-spell) data structure, which, by nature, contains time-varying 
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covariates and many tied events (Blossfeld et al., 2007). Multiple types of logit regressions were 
used to take account of the nature of different dependent variables (Allison, 1982). In particular, 
for regression of the number of practices adopted where there is a clear hierarchy among 
categories, I use ordered logit. For regression of selectivity in firms’ adoption of practices where 
the difference among categories is rather qualitative and arbitrary, I use multinomial logit. For 
regression of adoption of each practice, I use ordinary binary logit. 
 
Findings 
      Table 7 shows the descriptive statistics of all variables. The first question of this chapter 
asked which firms generally adopted the prescribed HR practices. The ordered logit model in 
Table 8 shows that the coefficient for Elapsed Time (p < 0.001, β = -0.110) and Construction 
Engineering Industry (p < 0.05, β = -0.520) are negative and significant, whereas the coefficient 
for Information Technology/Software Industry (p < 0.01, β = 0.566), Professional CEO (p < 0.1, 
β = 0.080), and HR Consulting (p < 0.001, β = 0.487) are significant and positive. The negative 
effect sizes of -0.110 and -0.520 indicate that the odds of adopting practices in any number (i.e., 
1, 2, 3, 4) in a given year compared to the odds of not adopting any practice are 10.42% (=e
-0.110
-
1) and 40.55% (=e
-0.520
-1) lower with one year elapse of time and for firms in the construction 
engineering industry, respectively. The positive effect sizes of 0.566, 0.080, and 0.566 indicate 
that the odds of adopting practices in any number (i.e., 1, 2, 3, 4) in a given year compared to the 




-1), and 62.74% (=e
0.487
-1) 
higher for firms in the information technology/software industry, firms controlled by non-owner 
professional CEOs, and firms that received consulting service, respectively. The same 
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interpretation holds for comparing all other thresholds in the number of practices adopted, say 
the odds of adopting four or three practices compared to the odds of adopting two, one practices, 
or non-adoption.  
      The second question concerned selectivity in firms’ adoption of practices. In particular, 
which firms more selectively and intelligently adopted the downstream HR practices, while 
excluding the upstream practices? In contrast, which firms selectively yet less intelligently 
adopted the upstream HR practices, while excluding the downstream HR practices? Comparing 
the coefficients for the worst and worse selectivity category with the coefficients for the better 
and best selectivity category in the multinomial logit model shown in Table 8 reveal some 
meaningful patterns. The model shows that the coefficient for Elapsed Time is not significant for 
the worst and worse selectivity category, but significant and negative for the better (p < 0.001, β 
= -0.121) and best (p < 0.1, β = -0.153) selectivity category. This indicates that the odds of 
adopting one downstream practice and the odds of adopting two downstream practice in a given 
year relative to all other selectivity categories are 11.4% (=e
-0.121
-1) and 14.19% (=e
-0.153
-1) lower 
with one year elapse of time, respectively. The model also shows that the coefficient for Foreign 
Ownership is not significant for the worst and worse selectivity category, but significant and 
positive for the better (p < 0.1, β = 0.237) and best (p < 0.01, β = 0.901) selectivity category. This 
indicates that the odds of adopting one downstream practice and the odds of adopting two 
downstream practice in a given year relative to all other selectivity categories are 26.74% 
(=e
0.237
-1) and 2.46 times (=e
0.901
) higher for firms that had foreign ownership, respectively. 
      Table 9 further shows the effects of the antecedents for each of the prescribed HR 
practice separately. The results confirm that foreign ownership has no significant effect on 
flattened hierarchy and open job bidding but has significant and positive effect on management 
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by objectives (p < 0.001, β = 0.612) and individual performance incentives (p < 0.05, β = 0.454). 
This indicates that the odds of adopting management by objectives and the odds of adopting 
individual performance incentives in a given year are 84.41% (=e
0.612
-1) and 57.46% (=e
0.454
-1) 
higher for firms that had foreign ownership, respectively. Table 9 also shows the effects of other 
agents on each HR practices. It can be seen that control by non-owner professional CEOs has 
significant effects on adoption of open job bidding and management by objectives, showing 
directionality toward neither upstream nor downstream HR practices. Receiving consulting 
service has significant effects on adoption of all four prescribed HR practices. In contrast, 
presence of HR committee in the board of directors has no significant effect on the four practices. 
      Finally, the third question of this chapter asked which firms adopted all of the four 
prescribed practices in a wholesale manner, rather than showing more selectivity. To examine 
this, I conducted an additional cross-sectional analysis examining the practices the sample firms 
adopted as of the end of the study period. As shown in Table 10, 15 out of the 511 sample firms 
adopted the prescribed practices in a wholesale manner (i.e., adopted all of the four prescribed 
practices) as of 2008. The table also shows the average values for the major independent 
variables over the seven year period (i.e., three surveys). The findings reveal firms that adopted 
all four practices in a wholesale way tend to have strategic orientation toward innovation, are 
controlled by professional CEO, and have HR committees in the board of directors. In addition, 
Table 10 shows that 41 firms selectively and intelligently adopted the downstream HR practices 
and rejected the upstream HR practices. Consistent with the findings from the regression 
analyses, firms that selectively adopted the downstream HR practices tend to have foreign 
ownership. Finally, the table shows that 8 sample firms selectively and less intelligently adopted 
the upstream HR practices and rejected the downstream HR practices. These firms tend to have 
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less strategic orientation toward innovation, have less foreign ownership, and receive consulting 
service. 
 
Emergent Patterns and Implications 
     Three main patterns can be detected from the above findings. The first concerns the timing 
of adoption. The findings show that Korean firms were less likely to adopt the prescribed HR 
practices with elapse of time. Importantly regarding selectivity in adoption, the pattern of 
selectively adopting the downstream HR practices is weakened with elapse of time. This is 
consistent with what other institutional theorists have traditionally suggested: While 
organizations may adopt practices for technical reasons in the earlier stages of the 
institutionalization processes, in the later stages, organizations tend to adopt practices for 
symbolic and legitimacy reasons (Tolbert & Zucker, 1983). The need to carefully evaluate the 
practices’ internal organizational ramifications can be less salient if organizations’ primary 
motive of adoption is to exhibit compliance to external constituencies (DiMaggio & Powell, 
1991; March, 2006). The second pattern concerns the local environment. The findings show that 
firms in the information technology/software industry were more likely to adopt the prescribed 
practices, whereas firms in the construction engineering industry were less likely to adopt the 
prescribed practices. Industries such as information technology and software are in general 
technology intensive, where firms in this industry particularly could have had the need to 
innovate. In contrast, the construction engineering industry is more capital intensive, where firms 
may have faced less need to innovate. This implies that Korean firms’ need for innovation, as 
partly determined by the local environment, has differently shaped their tendency to adopt or 
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reject practices (Zajac & Kraatz, 1993). 
      The third pattern concerns the influence exercised by different agents in the post-crisis 
environment of Korea. The findings show firms that had foreign ownership were more likely to 
selectively and intelligently adopt the downstream HR practices. One important characteristics of 
foreign ownership in Korea is that it was mostly oriented towards short-term capital gains 
through minority shareholdings rather than deep involvement in business operations through 
majority shareholdings. In short, foreign investors exerted strong yet indirect market pressures to 
Korean firms. Such influence can provide a healthy stimulus for organizational leaders to initiate 
informed search and change: It requires substantive change yet leaves room for the autonomy of 
organizational leaders and their own judgement to take place. Regarding the firms that 
selectively and less intelligently adopted the upstream HR practices, the findings reveal these 
firms disproportionately had less foreign ownership, less strategic orientation toward innovation, 
and received consulting service. This pattern is understandable given that firms with less need of 
strategic change can be less motivated to carefully evaluate whether certain practices undermine 
or uphold their institutional order. In addition, third-party intermediaries such as consulting firms 
generally possess less insider knowledge of the unique institutional order of organizations and 
can impose ill-informed choices. Finally with regard to firms that adopted practices in a 
wholesale way, the findings show these firms had strategic orientation toward innovation, were 
controlled by professional CEO, and had HR committees in the board of directors. Firms that 
changed their strategic orientation toward innovation can be prone to escalating-commitments 
and executing excessive changes (Zajac, Kraatz & Bresser, 2000). Control by non-owner 
professional CEOs and presence of HR committees in the board of directors can be considered as 
a form of direct guidance on strategy and practice, where firms under such strong and direct 
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influence can be susceptible to wholesale adoption. 
 
Conclusion 
      The main objective of this appendix was to address remaining empirical questions about 
the antecedents of adoption or variation among organizations in their adoption of prescribed 
practices. The appendix provided findings about the factors that influenced Korean firms’ 
adoption of the prescribed HR practices. In doing so, the appendix examined firms that were 
more or less likely to adopt the prescribed HR practices. In addition, it also examined firms that 
specifically adopted the upstream HR practices, downstream HR practices, or adopted these in a 
wholesale way. With awareness of the effectiveness of different types of practices as theorized 
and tested in chapter 2, this appendix was able to normatively evaluate various drivers or agents 
of practice adoption. However, the empirical findings about these drivers need further theoretical 
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TABLE 1 















based on Seniority 










Mean S. D. 1) 2) 3) 4) 5) 6) 7) 8) 9) 10) 11) 12) 13) 14) 15) 
(1) Innovation 15.54 208.8                
(2) Flattened Hierarchy .158 .364 -.020               
(3) Open Job Bidding .300 .458 .096 .168              
(4) Management by 
Objectives 




.374 .484 .064 .226 .256 .392            
(6) Firm Age 24.28 17.15 .045 .038 .052 .149 .075           
(7) Firm Size       
(-299) 
.384 .486 -.056 -.028 -.053 -.118 -.118 -.241          
(8) Firm Size    
(300-999) 
.424 .494 -.056 -.060 -.093 -.008 -.028 .048 -.677         
(9) Firm Size   
(1000-1999) 
.092 .289 .005 .036 .082 .028 .081 .124 -.251 -.273        
(10) Firm Size  
(2000- ) 
.100 .300 .178 .109 .160 .178 .160 .194 -.264 -.286 -.106       
(11) Publicly Traded 
(Listed in KSE) 
.313 .464 .093 .016 -.004 .130 .054 .485 -.244 .066 .095 .195      
(12) Publicly Traded      
(Listed in KOSDAQ) 
.279 .448 -.042 -.029 -.012 -.130 -.051 -.229 .408 -.205 -.136 -.193 -.419     
(13) Return on Assets 2.98 18.44 -.005 -.043 -.056 .000 .010 -.068 -.030 .027 .004 .001 -.021 -.052    
(14) Debt-to-Equity 
Ratio 
478.75 3270 -.007 -.026 .035 -.013 -.046 .034 -.064 .035 .028 .019 -.050 -.060 -.048   
(15) Log of R&D 
   Expense 
8.21 6.51 .086 -.015 .001 .108 .066 .103 -.078 .055 -.020 .055 .204 .084 -.002 -.098  
(16) Sample-Selection 
Indicator 
.051 .221 -.006 .048 .062 .101 -.007 -.262 -.026 -.040 .026 .082 -.072 -.023 .032 -.014 -.020 
n = 5944 firm-years. 
Note. Year Dummy and Industry variables are not included.
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TABLE 3 
Mean of and Correlation among Practice Adoption as of 2008 
 Mean (1) (2) (3) 
(1) Flattened Hierarchy .305    
(2) Open Job Bidding .493 .111   
(3) Management by Objectives .675 .179 .225  
(4) Individual Performance Incentives .607 .134 .201 .297 
n = 511 firms.
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TABLE 4 
Organizational Consequences of Practice Adoption (Fixed Effects) 
Variables 
Innovation (Patent Grant Counts) 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Year Dummies
1
      
(1999-2009) 
- - - - 









































Flattened Hierarchy    
-.190* 
(.086) 
Open Job Bidding    
.063 
(.074) 



















 351 351 351 351 
Sample Size (firm-years) 4100 4100 4100 4100 
Log-Likelihood -5179.98 -5176.77 -5172.44 -5170.81 
Wald χ
2 811.98*** 817.36*** 823.98*** 833.06*** 
*p<0.05 **p<0.01 ***p<0.001 All tests are two-tailed. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
Note 1. All Year Dummies are significant at p<0.001 level.                                                                                                                             






Organizational Consequences of Practice Adoption (Random Effects) 
Variables 
Innovation (Patent Grant Counts) 
Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
Year Dummies
1
        
(1999-2009) 





























































































































































Publicly Traded        









Publicly Traded        




























TABLE 5 (cont.) 
Variables 
Innovation (Patent Grant Counts) 
Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
































Flattened Hierarchy    
-.168* 
(.083) 
Open Job Bidding    
.081 
(.071) 

















Number of Firms 511 511 511 511 
Sample Size (firm-years) 5944 5944 5944 5944 
Log-Likelihood -6959.84 -6957.76 -6953.92 -6952.81 
Wald χ
2 1126.67*** 1127.61*** 1132.60*** 1145.47*** 
*p<0.05 **p<0.01 ***p<0.001 All tests are two-tailed. Standard errors are in parentheses.                         


























3. Lost a sense of unity and 
order 
1. Failure in Technological 
Development 
2. Global Sales and Firm Size 
Ranking Downturn 
3. Became a Local Player 











1. The “old soldiers” felt 
marginalized 
2. Became a “two-tier” 
organization, comprised of 
“fast-track professional 
managers” and “slow-track 
second-class citizens 
1. Failure in Technological 
Development 
2. Global Sales Downturn 
3. Became a Monopolistic Rent 
Seeker. Entered into Domestic 
Consumer Industries 
4. Betrayed National 
Developmental Duty 
Samsung 





1. Pure “Blue-Blooded” 
Samsung-man eligible for 
promotion to top executive 
positions 
2. Junior employee can be 
compensated as much as 
50% more than supervisor 
3. Sustained the existing 
institutional order 
1. Substantive Technological 
Development 
2. Achieved new highs in 
Exportation 
3. Grew as Prosperous Global 
Player  
4. Fulfilled National 
Developmental Duty 
Hyundai 





1. Pure Hyundai-man 
appointed to key strategic 
position 
2. While bringing in 
consultants from Monitor 
Group to strengthen the 
marketing function, 
incumbents’ job security 
was not compromised 
3. Sustained the existing 
institutional order 
1. Substantive Technological 
Development 
2. Renowned for continued 
Exportation 
3. Grew as Top 5 in the Global 
Automobile Industry and Top 
2 Conglomerate in Korea 






Mean S.D. 1) 2) 3) 4) 5) 6) 7) 8) 9) 10) 11) 12) 13) 14) 15) 16) 
(1) Strategic Orientation 2.08 .770                 
(2) Foreign Ownership .377 .485 .115                
(3) Professional CEO 2.12 1.19 .042 .141               
(4) HR Committee .609 .488 .094 -.002 .017              
(5) Consulting .545 .498 .141 .046 .116 .089             
(6) Elapsed Time 4 2 -.022 -.021 .029 -.082 .107            
(7) Firm Age 25.99 17.26 .034 .075 -.011 .068 .029 .115           
(8) Firm Size (-299) .386 .487 -.023 -.074 -.165 -.056 -.106 -.001 -.237          
(9) Firm Size (300-999) .420 .494 -.105 -.069 -.023 .033 .014 .001 .055 -.675         
(10) Firm Size (1000-
1999) 
.092 .289 .039 .042 .107 -.027 -.011 -.000 .119 -.252 -.271        
(11) Firm Size (2000- ) .102 .302 .171 .193 .201 .061 .159 -.000 .178 -.267 -.287 -.107       
(12) Publicly Traded .309 .462 .096 .194 -.133 .056 .103 .001 .264 .140 -.124 -.033 .009      
(13) Re-established after 
Crisis 
.062 .241 -.013 .046 .124 .016 .016 .003 -.298 -.037 -.043 .030 .101 -.095     
(14) Return on Assets 2.46 20.42 .069 .047 -.000 .002 .008 -.102 -.029 -.082 .062 .016 .016 -.107 .021    
(15) Debt-to-Equity Ratio 301.86 1959 .021 -.022 .068 .037 -.007 -.050 .025 -.050 .014 .037 .023 -.084 -.004 -.037   
(16) Sales Growth Rate 27.07 138.75 .022 .024 .025 -.019 -.017 -.029 -.024 -.012 -.015 .052 -.006 -.020 -.003 -.020 -.002  
(17) R&D Intensity 1.15 7.64 .046 -.000 -.051 -.009 .021 .035 -.038 .019 .006 -.020 -.020 .053 -.013 -.011 -.012 -.003 
 n = 3575 firm-years 
 Note. Practice adoption variables are not included given observations are dropped after adoption. Industry variables are not included.
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TABLE 8 






















.136             
(.347) 
-.035              
(040) 
-.121***           
(.033) 























































































































































































































































































-49.94†      
(27.76) 
.172              
(.107) 
-.014             
(.097) 
























































2.00         
(.268) 
    
cut 2 
3.92         
(.280) 
    
cut 3 
5.72         
(.370) 




    
Number of Firms 504 504 
Sample Size (firm-years) 3383 3383 
Pseudo R
2
 2.86% 4.8% 
Log Pseudolikelihood -1658.30 -1694.08 
Wald χ
2
 116.15*** - 




Antecedents of Adopting each Prescribed HR Practice 
Variables 



































































































































































































TABLE 9 (cont.) 
Variables 




































































































Sample Size (firm-years) 2917 2177 1859 1976 
Pseudo R
2
 6.28% 8.78% 7.70% 6.64% 
Log-Likelihood -429.90 -454.19 -589.72 -540.99 
Wald χ
2
 65.04*** 107.34*** 117.31*** 82.10*** 
































15 2.19 0.36 2.58 0.72 0.67 
Intelligent 
Selectivity 




8 1.86 0.34 2.14 0.68 0.77 
Control 
Group 
447 2.09 0.37 2.09 0.60 0.53 
n = 511 firms 
